a case study of the republic of Kazakhtan's WTO accession process by Nigmatulina, Malike
 
 
 
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND DIFFICULTIES DEVELOPING 
COUNTREIS FACE WHILE INTEGRATING INTO GLOBAL 
TRADING SYSTEM – A CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
KAZAKHTAN’S WTO ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
By 
 
Malika Nigmatulina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
 ２
 
 
 
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND DIFFICULTIES DEVELOPING COUNTREIS 
FACE WHILE INTEGRATING INTO GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM – A 
CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHTAN’S WTO ACCESSION 
PROCESS 
 
By 
 
Malika Nigmatulina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
Professor Dukguen Ahn 
 ３
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND DIFFICULTIES DEVELOPING COUNTREIS 
FACE WHILE INTEGRATING INTO GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM – A 
CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHTAN’S WTO ACCESSION 
PROCESS 
 
By 
 
Malika Nigmatulina 
 
 
It has become quiet popular among some scholars and anti-globalists to argue 
that free trade is not in reality free for everyone and it only makes less and least 
developed nations more dependent and controlled by the rich states. Yet, I personally 
use an assumption that “freer” rather than free trade, is in overall assessment 
beneficial for further development and growth of both rich and poor countries. 
Notably it is due to the global trade and its continued liberalization along with other 
major scientific and technological developments that the 20th century remains as one 
of the most remarkable periods in the history, when achievement of an unprecedented 
increase in goods and services production as well as huge economic growth became 
possible. 
However, as societies become more affluent, the attraction of and interest in 
pursuing non-economic objectives becomes stronger and demand for protectionism 
also increases. Thus, some undermine the achievements, which were possible due to 
the global trading system functioning and expansion, and result in the trading system 
becoming a victim of its own. 
Despite the fact that developing nations have to muddle through the various 
challenges and obstacles while making their ways to WTO accession, aspiration and 
 ４
ambition to join the world trading system and to seek potential benefits for themselves 
have not been declining among them.  
After evaluating the history of the WTO system development and its overall 
effect on its members, it is perceived by many economists and WTO advocates, that 
WTO accession for developing and transitioning countries brings with it many 
benefits. Among which are an improved access to markets for their exports, the 
overall positive effects of increased transparency, predictability, and government 
credibility, as well as strengthening of their multilateral rule-based framework of 
economic reform.  
For instance, those who abstain from the WTO membership are often severely 
discriminated by their trade partners, especially on the grounds of being perceived as 
non-market economies, and thus, remain as main targets for anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures.  
Accession into the WTO requires adopting a set of norms and institutions, 
which promote market liberalization, evolution of a well defined, independent judicial 
system, as well as stronger enforcement and compliance with the laws and regulations 
for conducting a fare trade. Such measures of multilateral policy reform, supported in 
the framework of countries multilateral obligations and commitments, result in 
increased transparency and credibility of the government1. 
 In addition, WTO membership also provides permanent multilateral most-
favored nation status, tools of legal protection in anti-dumping cases and admittance 
to the dispute settlement mechanism. In overall assessment, the benefits from WTO 
membership can be classified in three categories: (a) improvement of national 
institutions and policies for international trade conduct in both goods and services 
                                                 
1 See Bacchetta and Drabek, p.12 
 ５
which is needed before accession into WTO can be accomplished; (b) improvements 
in the ease and security of market access to major export markets; (c) access to a 
dispute settlement mechanism for trade issues. 
For developing countries and economies in transition, accession to and 
membership in the WTO is a delicate and cumbersome experience. As many latest 
WTO applicants are largely developing or transitioning economies, numerous WTO 
issues like SPS, GATS, TRIMs, and TRIPs, place heavy burdens on these countries as 
they modify and establish new laws, regulations, policies and enforcement 
mechanisms to comply with WTO requirements. The need to bring domestic 
legislation into conformity with WTO rules, negotiating and putting into action 
concessions on market access for trade in goods and services, transparency 
requirements, rising new trade issues, and the need to set up and retain professional 
trade-related research expertise places heavy burdens on applicants and developing 
members that not infrequently exceed their institutional capacity for formulating 
policy options or negotiation strategies. Furthermore, many developing countries are 
subject to discrimination by such trading partners as the US and the EC, despite WTO 
principle of automatic award of permanent and unconditional MFN status to any new 
member of the organization. In reality, though, the US for instance, invokes the non-
application clause of Article XIII of the Marrakesh Agreement on a country's 
adherence to the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act 
regarding freedom of emigration. For example, the US extended a permanent MFN 
status to Mongolia only in July 1999, which is more than 2 years after the date of 
accession (Bacchetta and Drabek, p.13). The EU Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
“On protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community,” deals with the application of anti-dumping regulations on the countries 
 ６
considered as a "non-market economy" by the EC. Hence, in accordance with the 
Article 2 of the above regulation, dumping margins are computed by reference to a 
suitable "analogue country" (i.e. a third country with market economy) and not on the 
basis of individual data for each exporter. However, individual exporters can submit 
claims for market economy treatment. If they can prove that they operate with 
sufficient independence from the State, individual exporters can then be granted 
"market economy status" for the purposes of the investigation and see their dumping 
margins established by reference to their own accounting information 2. 
Although, such problems do not completely prevent a country from accessing 
into WTO, it is clear that they affect the length, intricacy and complexity of the 
process for each accessing country.  Therefore, I would like to make an assessment of 
such problems in general and based on Kazakhstan’s negotiation process. In my 
assessment I would like to find out why such obstacles exist and how they slow down 
a country’s WTO accession process, as well as to try to suggest ways which can 
reduce total WTO accession cost for the countries working on joining WTO in the 
near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The European Community On-Line 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/legis/adgreg02a.htm 
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It has become quiet popular among some scholars and anti-globalists to argue that free trade 
is not in reality free for everyone and it only makes less and least developed nations more dependent 
and controlled by the rich states. Yet, I personally use an assumption that “freer” rather than free 
trade, is in overall assessment beneficial for further development and growth of both rich and poor 
countries. Notably it is due to the global trade and its continued liberalization along with other major 
scientific and technological developments that the 20th century remains as one of the most 
remarkable periods in the history, when achievement of an unprecedented increase in goods and 
services production as well as huge economic growth became possible. 
However, as societies become more affluent, the attraction of and interest in pursuing non-
economic objectives becomes stronger and demand for protectionism also increases. Thus, some 
undermine the achievements, which were possible due to the global trading system functioning and 
expansion, and result in the trading system becoming a victim of its own. 
Despite the fact that developing nations have to muddle through the various challenges and 
obstacles while making their ways to WTO accession, aspiration and ambition to join the world 
trading system and to seek potential benefits for themselves have not been declining among them.  
After evaluating the history of the WTO system development and its overall effect on its 
members, it is perceived by many economists and WTO advocates, that WTO accession for 
developing and transitioning countries brings with it many benefits. Among which are an improved 
access to markets for their exports, the overall positive effects of increased transparency, 
predictability, and government credibility, as well as strengthening of their multilateral rule-based 
framework of economic reform.  
For instance, those who abstain from the WTO membership are often severely discriminated 
by their trade partners, especially on the grounds of being perceived as non-market economies, and 
thus, remain as main targets for anti-dumping and countervailing measures.  
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Accession into the WTO requires adopting a set of norms and institutions, which promote 
market liberalization, evolution of a well defined, independent judicial system, as well as stronger 
enforcement and compliance with the laws and regulations for conducting a fare trade. Such 
measures of multilateral policy reform, supported in the framework of countries multilateral 
obligations and commitments, result in increased transparency and credibility of the government3. 
 In addition, WTO membership also provides permanent multilateral most-favored nation 
status, tools of legal protection in anti-dumping cases and admittance to the dispute settlement 
mechanism. In overall assessment, the benefits from WTO membership can be classified in three 
categories: (a) improvement of national institutions and policies for international trade conduct in 
both goods and services which is needed before accession into WTO can be accomplished; (b) 
improvements in the ease and security of market access to major export markets; (c) access to a 
dispute settlement mechanism for trade issues. 
For developing countries and economies in transition, accession to and membership in the 
WTO is a delicate and cumbersome experience. As many latest WTO applicants are largely 
developing or transitioning economies, numerous WTO issues like SPS, GATS, TRIMs, and TRIPs, 
place heavy burdens on these countries as they modify and establish new laws, regulations, policies 
and enforcement mechanisms to comply with WTO requirements. The need to bring domestic 
legislation into conformity with WTO rules, negotiating and putting into action concessions on 
market access for trade in goods and services, transparency requirements, rising new trade issues, 
and the need to set up and retain professional trade-related research expertise places heavy burdens 
on applicants and developing members that not infrequently exceed their institutional capacity for 
formulating policy options or negotiation strategies. Furthermore, many developing countries are 
subject to discrimination by such trading partners as the US and the EC, despite WTO principle of 
automatic award of permanent and unconditional MFN status to any new member of the 
                                                 
3 See Bacchetta and Drabek, p.12 
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organization. In reality, though, the US for instance, invokes the non-application clause of Article 
XIII of the Marrakesh Agreement on a country's adherence to the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment to the 1974 Trade Act regarding freedom of emigration. For example, the US extended a 
permanent MFN status to Mongolia only in July 1999, which is more than 2 years after the date of 
accession (Bacchetta and Drabek, p.13). The EU Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 “On 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community,” deals 
with the application of anti-dumping regulations on the countries considered as a "non-market 
economy" by the EC. Hence, in accordance with the Article 2 of the above regulation, dumping 
margins are computed by reference to a suitable "analogue country" (i.e. a third country with market 
economy) and not on the basis of individual data for each exporter. However, individual exporters 
can submit claims for market economy treatment. If they can prove that they operate with sufficient 
independence from the State, individual exporters can then be granted "market economy status" for 
the purposes of the investigation and see their dumping margins established by reference to their 
own accounting information 4. 
Although, such problems do not completely prevent a country from accessing into WTO, it 
is clear that they affect the length, intricacy and complexity of the process for each accessing 
country.  Therefore, I would like to make an assessment of such problems in general and based on 
Kazakhstan’s negotiation process. In my assessment I would like to find out why such obstacles 
exist and how they slow down a country’s WTO accession process, as well as to try to suggest ways 
which can reduce total WTO accession cost for the countries working on joining WTO in the near 
future. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The European Community On-Line http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/legis/adgreg02a.htm 
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BACKGROUND 
The World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor organization to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which existed since 1947, came into force on January 1, 1995. The 
WTO system was developed through a series of trade negotiations (rounds), carried out in the 
framework of GATT. The first rounds of negotiations dealt mainly with tariff reductions, but later 
ones included other areas such as anti-dumping and non-tariff measures. The so-called Uruguay 
Round held in 1986-1994, led to the WTO creation, which considerably extended GATT's coverage 
areas with trade in services and trade related intellectual property rights. The WTO does not only 
control a wider range of trade agreements, but it also exercises much broader powers in terms of 
decision-making procedure improvement and compliance by member states. An obligation to 
comply with the rules and regulations and each members obligations is one of the significant 
achievement points, since the GATT was merely a multinational treaty, and as a result decisions 
taken under the GATT were taken by the “CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly”, not by any 
organization body. Thus, the problem of incompliance and reluctance of the member states to fulfill 
their obligations remained a huge obstacle for full fledge GATT operation. Among other WTO 
introductions is a mechanism of trade dispute settlements, which became an integral part of the 
WTO. 
The fundamental principles and rules of the GATT/WTO include: non-discriminatory trade, 
i.e. mutual most favored nation treatment in trade and mutual granting of the national treatment to 
goods and services of foreign origin; trade regulation mostly by tariff methods; refusal to use 
quantitative or other restrictions; trade policy transparency; settlement of trade disputes by 
consultation and negotiations, etc 
In sum, the most important WTO functions include: control over compliance with the 
Uruguay round agreements; multilateral trade talks and discussions between interested member 
countries; settlement of trade disputes; monitoring of member states’ national trade policies; 
technical assistance to developing nations in WTO-related matters; cooperation with specialized 
international organizations. 
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THE WTO ACCESSION PROCESS 
The procedure of the WTO accession has developed through the 50 year history of 
GATT/WTO systems and consists of several stages, successful completion of which in accordance 
with the Article XII of the Marrakesh Agrement Establishing the WTO grants the following right, 
"Any state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of other matters provided for in this Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to the WTO on terms to be agreed between such 
state or separate customs territory and the members of the WTO."5 
Since accession to the WTO requires members’ agreement on terms and obligations, it is 
basically done through the process of series of negotiations, which is quite different from other 
international entities accession procedures. In general accession goes through four stages: 
Fact-finding/ Information-gathering: First of all, the applicant provides a memorandum on 
its foreign trade regime describing all aspects of its trade policy, which relate to WTO agreements. 
Those documents than are submitted to the WTO in a Memorandum, which is examined by the 
Working Party dealing with the country’s application. The memorandum usually includes general 
economic indicators and policies affecting trade in agricultural and industrial goods, import and 
export regulations, intellectual property rights, trade in services, customs valuation, and licensing 
requirements. The Working Group evaluates in detail the economic mechanism and trade-political 
regime of the applicant, checks their compliance with the WTO rules, and provides questions and 
comments for response by the applicant.  
Negotiation Phase: After the Working Party has assessed the principles and policies parallel 
bilateral talks between the applicant and other WTO countries begin. WTO member countries’ 
negotiators develop a formal request to the applicant country to lower tariffs and other barriers to 
                                                 
5 World Trade Organization website 
www. wto.org 
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trade, and to provide specific sectoral market access commitments, as well as “commercially 
significant” concessions, which the acceding country will be ready to make to WTO members in 
terms of their access to its goods and services markets. The negotiations phase continues until the 
Working Party agrees that all necessary changes have been made to bring the applicants foreign 
trade regime into compliance with the WTO.  
 Protocol of Accession: The bilateral tariff, non-tariff, and market access commitments, 
once agreed to by the Working Party, are combined to form the draft protocol. The summary of the 
discussions in the Working Party is contained in a Report of the Working Party (Suranovic, p.99). In 
addition, Schedules of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and of Specific Commitments on 
Services are prepared. The above documents are then annexed to the Protocol of Accession, which 
comprises of the terms of accession agreed by the applicant and the Working Party members. 
Membership: All documents elaborated by the Working Party are presented to the WTO 
General Council or the Ministerial Conference. If a two-thirds majority of WTO members vote in 
favor, the applicant is free to sign the protocol and to accede to the organization. Once a member of 
the WTO, countries must be subject to the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) in order to 
ensure transparency and impart confidence that all members will be subject to the same 
requirements and monitoring. 
Accession to the WTO proves to be a much more complicated process than accession to the 
GATT 1947. The complementary issues and sectors embarked by the Uruguay Round must be 
addressed by the WTO accessing countries. The negotiation talks, which arise during the whole 
WTO accession period, are bilateral because different countries have different trading interests. 
Major players, the accessing country and the Working Party members, try to each push for their 
goals and interests. Thus, for instance WTO accessing country presses hard to maintain its tariffs 
and other protective measures as high as possible, while also negotiating on receiving a longer 
implementation period and so on. On the other hand, the Working Party members, among which 
 18
generally are the most advanced economies in the world such as the US, the EU, Canada, Australia 
and others, in case with Russia’s WTO negotiations there are 67 countries in its Working Group (6), 
push the accessing country for larger tariffs reductions, full elimination of subsidies and other non-
tariff barriers to trade. The new member’s commitments must apply equally to all WTO members 
under the normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally. In other 
words, the talks determine the benefits other WTO members can expect when a new member joins.  
CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES FACED BY THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Domestic constraints 
As required by the WTO rules and obligations, every member must fulfill its obligations in 
such area of domestic regulations as customs and tax systems, transparency of the legal and 
legislative systems, protection of intellectual property rights, harmonization of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards, and other areas. While it is often perceived that such institutional and 
policy changes can be done by the stroke of the Government’s pen, the reality is indeed much more 
complicated, because fulfillment of such obligations has its real, money term costs for the country 
trying to get accepted into WTO. The implementation process of for instance customs reform in 
regard to the Agreement on Trade Related – Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) (7), will 
require not only the adding of necessary amendments into the customs legislation, but will also 
entail purchase of necessary equipment, training of personnel, and establishment of a satisfactory 
checks and balances system. In fulfilling its obligations under the TRIPs requirements, Mexico, for 
example, has spent more than US$30 million to upgrade intellectual property laws and their 
enforcement (Finger, p.427). 
                                                 
6 Russia and World Trade Organization  
www.wto.ru 
7 The areas covered by the TRIPS Agreement: 
*Copyright and related rights 
*Trademarks, including service marks 
*Geographical indications 
*Industrial designs 
*Patents 
*Layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits 
*Undisclosed information, including trade secrets (www.wto.org) 
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The implementation cost for standard requirements under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary and 
Agriculture Agreements might require larger amounts of funds. For instance, Hungary has spent 
over US$40 million on the upgrade of its slaughterhouses’ sanitation levels alone (Finger, p.427). 
An estimated average cost of domestic regulations and standards restructuring in the framework of 
the three major WTO agreements is equal to US$ 150 million (Finger, p.427).   
 Aside the high implementation costs of the technical issues, the problem of lack of trained 
and WTO rules and regulations savvy personnel also remains as one of the major slow downs to the 
country’s accession into the WTO. The preparation of the memorandum and other necessary 
documents for the submission to the WTO, presents serious difficulties for the governments, which 
by and large lack enough human and/or technical resources to address a full range of issues to be 
incorporated into the memorandum effectively and on in timely manner. In some cases even 
language proficiency and familiarity with the concepts of legal and economic issues become a 
significant burden for the applicant. Hence, a small size of the negotiation coordination group can 
result in a lengthy preparation of the initial memorandum (Schmidt, 12). Plus, the frequency of the 
formal meetings between the country’s negotiation team and the central agencies, as well as 
overcoming of communication barriers between the Permanent Mission in Geneva and the capital, 
also affect the accession period length. In Moldova and in Kyrgyz Republic the negotiation groups 
met once per month, while in Vietnam such meetings occur every 2 to 3 months, and in Lithuania 
they were organized on a daily basis (Schmidt, p.15).  Indian permanent mission, on the other hand, 
is instructed to attend all of the WTO meetings and report everything to the capital (Schmidt, p.18).  
8 
                                                 
8When the Uruguay Round began in 1987, the GATT/WTO members totaled 65 developing countries, 20 of which did not have 
delegations in Geneva. Of the 20, 15 were represented from embassies in other European cities, and 5 by delegations based in their 
national capitals. Furthermore, developing country delegations were notably smaller than those of the industrial countries. The 
European Union had in Geneva a delegation of 10. EU member states’ delegations included an additional 57 persons. The U.S. 
delegation numbered 10, the Japanese, 15. Only 12 developing countries had delegations of more than 3 persons. The larger ones, 
Korea, Mexico, and Tanzania, had 7 each; Brazil and Indonesia, 6 each; Thailand, Hong Kong, and Egypt, 5 each. Of the 48 least 
developed countries, 29 are WTO members, but only 11 of these maintain delegations in Geneva. (see Finger, p.433)  
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Many times implementation of such WTO agreements as SPS, TBT and GPA by developing 
countries cannot be successfully achieved without a comprehensive trade-related technical 
assistance (TRTA). Overwhelming number of developing countries have to seek assistance from 
foreign experts often funded by bilateral aid agencies such as World Bank, UN, USAID as well as 
from the WTO itself. However, since the demand for the WTO technical assistance is far exceeding 
the resources available, the WTO secretariat can only be of assistance in a very limited way in the 
accession process. The WTO budget allocates very limited resources to accession of new members 
(Schmidt, p.26; Michalopoulos, WTO Accession for countries in transition, p.18). Moreover, in 
order to receive a technical assistance from the donor the country has to wait for a certain period 
until the funds are provided and disbursed. Depending on the donor such period can take up to 2 
years, which reduces effectiveness of the aid. As provided by Schmidt, the technical assistance the 
Kyrgyz Republic received came solely from the USAID, while the US and EU experts helped with 
the Moldova’s accession into the WTO (9). Nevertheless, most of the recipients of such assistance 
say that technical aid did not have a dramatic effect neither on improvement of the negotiations not 
on their outcomes (Schmidt, p.27) (10).  
On the other hand, institutional problems have their own importance and difficulties in 
settling. Thereby, effective enactment of legislation and regulations, which bring the regimes of the 
transition economies into conformity with the WTO rules, is often a bigger domestic constraint than 
lack of technical assistance or trained personnel. Such items as the laws on the Central Bank, 
financial institutions, joint stock companies, licensing of various types of economic activities, 
                                                 
9 The Kyrgyz Republic was the candidate with the quickest accession time in entering the global trade body to date. 
10 WTO technical cooperation  
The WTO holds regular training sessions on trade policy in Geneva. In addition, it organizes about 400 technical cooperation 
activities annually, including seminars and workshops in various countries and courses in Geneva. Targeted are developing countries 
and countries in transition from former socialist or communist systems, with a special emphasis on African countries. Seminars have 
also been organized in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Middle East and Pacific. 
 Funding for technical cooperation and training comes from three sources: the WTO’s regular budget, voluntary contributions from 
WTO members, and cost-sharing either by countries involved in an event or by international organizations. 
The present regular WTO budget for technical cooperation is 1.36 million Swiss francs and for training 4.29 million Swiss francs. 
(www.wto.org) 
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domestic taxation, regulations on food and alcoholic beverages, veterinary medicine and pests 
subject to quarantine, patent and copyright protection, and consumer protection cover so many 
various areas and not only technical expertise, that merely more time is required to bring them in 
conformity with the WTO (Michalopoulos, WTO Accession for countries in transition, p.7). 
Moreover, domestic industry and business elites, in order to protect their economic interests, often 
form or finance lobby groups, which try to ban or slow down the process of amending legislation 
significant for each lobbied industrial sector.     
The importance of political consensus and stability in the country are equally crucial. Thus, 
for instance, in countries like Algeria, Cambodia, Nepal, Sudan and Uzbekistan the internal political 
instability and conflict about some issues, country’s WTO accession issue in particular, have 
resulted in delays in the process (Michalopoulos, WTO Accession for countries in transition, p.17,) 
(11). 
Nevertheless, for many “WTO member want to be” it is politically difficult to adopt a liberal 
trade strategy at accession. Politicians and interest groups who are used to acting selfishly will take 
the political cost involved in "tying their hands" seriously (Langhammer and Lucke, p.6). 
Since membership in WTO brings in a new bunch of obligations to liberalize trade through 
reduction of tariffs and other non-tariff trade barriers, at the time when country’s major trading 
partners, which are also WTO members, take advantage of totally legal opportunities under the 
                                                 
11 Algeria - Collapsing oil prices in 1986 and continuing political and economic crises during the 1990s, however, cut average 
incomes in half. Starting from a position of extreme vulnerability in the early 1990s—low oil prices, unsustainable foreign debt 
servicing, severe acts of terrorism that led to the tragic loss of life, and sociopolitical tension—the country has remarkably rebounded, 
especially since 1996. Despite recent progress, however, Algeria faces major challenges. The country’s primary developmental 
objective is to restore sociopolitical stability. High unemployment and inadequate public services continue, and government reforms 
are critically necessary to create conditions for sustained growth and poverty reduction. 
Sudan - Sudan is a country rich with potential but severely impacted by the effects of a civil war, which entered its 20th 
consecutive year in 2002. Sudan remains on the poorest countries in the world, with widespread poverty and a weak and uneven 
economic base and infrastructure. Per capita income in 2001 was $340.  
Uzbekistan is a low-income country with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$ 460. The country is rich in natural 
resources, such as coal, copper, gold, natural gas, oil, silver and uranium. Agriculture accounts for some 35 percent of GDP and about 
40 percent of employment, despite the country's difficult terrain. Incomes and living standards have improved little since the early 
1990s and rural poverty continues to be significant. Of the estimated 27.5 percent of the population -- or about 6.7 million people - 
who are unable to meet their basic consumption needs, some two-thirds live in the rural areas. The country also faces serious 
environmental problems. (www.imf.org) 
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WTO to limit market access - for example by maintaining high levels of protection in agriculture, 
the mood for liberalization and opening of domestic market undergoes a dramatic change toward 
growing resistance to openness (Michalopoulos, WTO Accession for countries in transition, p.11). 
Generally, more liberal trade regime endorsed by WTO accession exposes industries and companies 
in small, relatively vulnerable economies to larger foreign competition, as a result increase in 
imports, brought by market opening, emerges faster than growth the newly WTO member’s exports, 
which in turn are generate by improved market access abroad. Consequently, since particular 
commercial interests in developing countries dominate/influence the country’s political economy of 
both domestic and international trade policy, overcoming resistance to the idea of trade 
liberalization and WTO accession can also be time and effort consuming.     
Thus, while at a general policy/decision-making level WTO applicant countries might agree 
that accession to the WTO is of principle importance to their national interests and overall operation 
of their international trade, the accession process cannot conclude successfully, unless certain 
commercial interests in those countries are satisfied and secured through the means of negotiations 
for special sector protection at least temporary and partial. 
International constraints 
There is a feeling on the part of many developing nations that they are being left behind, that 
they are receiving a disproportionately small share of the benefits of a more liberal global trading 
system. Moreover, the developing countries argue that the developed-rich WTO members like the 
US, the EU, and others continue to maintain high protectionist measures in shielding their domestic 
industries while pushing for protection reductions in the developing world. Not surprisingly, the real 
situation has proven claims of developing countries to be true for the most part true. For instance, 
Craig Vangrasstek in his comment to Alan V. Deardorff’s “Market Access for Developing 
Countries” states that the United States in its history of international trade policy formation “moved 
from nondiscriminatory protection (1816-1933) to discriminatory liberalization (1934-1942), to a 
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period of nondiscriminatory liberalization since 1942 that, beginning in the mid-1960s, has also seen 
a growing number of discriminatory agreements and programs” (Porter, Sauvé, Subramanian, 
Zampetti, p.176) (12). 
Furthermore, developing countries claim that the rich countries have the problem of  
“unfamiliarity with and unwillingness to learn the conditions” faced by the other party (Finger, 
p.434). The “Do it my way!” attitude of the developed countries twists the arms of the developing 
nations, because frequently such attitude provides an “all-or-nothing” option for the developing 
nations in trade issues.  
Another important predicament confronted by the developing countries during their accession to the 
WTO, is the political pressure, both domestic and international, for a faster WTO membership 
attainment. Despite the fact that such political interest is understandable, since WTO membership is 
internationally popular, due to its association with democracy, liberalization, progressive political 
and economic reform implementation, the diplomatic value of becoming a WTO member often 
clouds the importance and seriousness of the negotiations. Thus, for instance, as Finger puts it “in 
many countries the obligations that came with the WTO membership were not carefully considered” 
(Finger, p.434). For example, as described by Langhammer and Lucke, the main emphasis in tariff 
negotiations “should not be on the average tariff as such but on tariff escalation, exemptions, and 
transparency in general.” (Langhammer and Lucke, p.9)  
Shortage of real support from the developed countries is another constraint in smooth and 
mutually beneficial WTO accession. In spite of the fact that many WTO agreements provide for 
technical assistance to developing countries, in particular such provisions exist in the Agreements on 
SPS, TBT, Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation) and the TRIPs, this provision are not 
                                                 
12 In 1960 the degree of trade openness (exports and imports divided by GDP) stood between 20 and 30 percent in France, Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom, with considerably higher levels in smaller countries. By contrast, in the US, international trade 
amounted to barely 7 percent of GDP. In the next forty years exposure to trade increased significantly on both sides of the Atlantic 
reaching between 40 and 50 percent in the large European countries and nearly 20 percent in the United States (Porter, Sauvé, 
Subramanian, Zampetti, p.184). 
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completely binding ones, as a result the rich countries are often reluctant in providing real assistance 
to the developing members. Consequently, developing nations again get the impression that they 
have taken bounding commitments in exchange for the unbound commitments of the rich (13)  
ISSUES 
Agreements on Agriculture, SPS, and TBT 
In comparison, agriculture accounts for 17 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
middle-income countries, and amounts to 35 percent in the poorest countries. Agricultural exports 
account for more than one-third of the total exports in almost half of the developing countries. 
Notwithstanding the fact the developed countries continuously use subsidies to slant the benefits of 
agricultural trade in their favor. Each year, developed states spend in excess of US$300 billion in 
support of agriculture, which is six times the amount they allocate to foreign development assistance 
(Kevin Watkins and Joachim von Braun, p.2).  
Due to huge subsidy amounts production of agricultural goods drastically increases, which in 
its turn leads to great surpluses, which are later discarded into the world markets at distinctly lower 
prices, which however, are the outcomes of the reduced production costs. Meanwhile, high tariffs 
and other trade barriers are used to keep imports out. The model used by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute, which is ironically located in Washington D.C., USA, has estimated that 
an end to rich countries’ support in agriculture would generate annual gains of US$40 billion for 
                                                 
13 The following are three major examples of provisions for differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries: 
 
In Article XXXVII of GATT 1994 the developed Members of WTO have committed themselves to accord high priority to the 
reduction and elimination of barriers to products currently or potentially of particular export interest to developing countries, 
including customs duties and other restrictions which differentiate unreasonably between such products in their primary and in their 
processed forms. 
 
The 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment (the "Enabling Clause") permits developed Members to grant 
preferential tariff treatment to developing countries. It also permits developing Members to enter into regional or global arrangements 
among themselves for mutual reduction or elimination of tariff and, in accordance with criteria and conditions which may be 
prescribed by the Ministerial Conference, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures. 
 
Article IV of GATS stipulates that the increasing participation of developing country Members in world trade shall be facilitated 
through the negotiation of specific commitments, relating to the strengthening of their domestic service capacity and its efficiency and 
competitiveness through access to technology on a commercial basis; the improvement of their access to distribution channels and 
information networks; and the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them. 
(www.wto.org) 
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developing countries, with Sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s poorest region, gaining US$3.3 billion. 
The estimated gains will result from an increase in exports (especially for Latin America) and 
import substitution effects (Kevin Watkins and Joachim von Braun, p.10) (14). 
As calculated by the International Food Policy Research Institute, tariffs on agricultural 
goods in the EU and U.S. are four to five times those applied to manufactured goods, and peaks in 
excess of 100 percent, for such items as groundnuts in the U.S. and dairy produce in Europe are 
pretty common. It is also stated that while it is obvious that modern technology and equipment, as 
well as both financial and qualified human resource lacking poorest African countries may not be 
able to generate a sizeable surplus of dairy products for instance, they still have decent chances of 
doing so in beef, sugar, and cotton exports, which disappointingly, still remain as the most protected 
products in the EU, the US and some other developed countries (www.ifpri.org) (15). 
Evidently, almost all of the developing countries that would like to export, for example, beef 
to Europe have to face tariffs of up to 150 percent, along those exporters of some fruits and nuts to 
the US market, which are encountered with the tariffs of 200 percent or more. There are irrefutably 
more hindrances to agricultural products trade only, taking into account phytosanitary and TBT 
regulations and requirements. 
The major goal of the SPS Agreement, as envisaged by the WTO explanation, is to cover 
measures adopted by countries to protect human or animal life from food-borne risks, human health 
                                                 
14 Agricultural growth in developing countries declined to 2.2 percent per year in the past 10 years, compared to 3.4 percent in the 
previous decade. Although agricultural trade has increased in absolute terms over the past decade, its share in total trade has dropped 
to less than 10 percent. And developing countries account for about one-third of exports, roughly the same share of exports as in 1980. 
 
15 Research by Oxfam has shown that the distribution of subsidies among farmers in both Europe and the U.S. is more unequal than 
the distribution of income in Brazil, one of the world’s most unequal countries in terms of income. The biggest 25 percent of EU 
subsidy recipients receive more than 60 percent of all subsidies. In the U.S. 60 percent of farmers get no support at all, while the 
biggest 7 percent account for 50 percent of government payments. The large slice of subsidies directed toward sugar and dairy 
producers makes up part of this distorted picture. 
 
An IFPRI model predicts that an end to rich country support in agriculture would generate annual gains of US$40 billion for 
developing countries, with Sub-Saharan Africa, the world’s poorest region, gaining US$3.3 billion. The gains result from an increase 
in exports (especially for Latin America) and import substitution effects. 
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from animal or plant carried diseases, and animal and plants from pests and diseases. Therefore, the 
specific aims of SPS measures are to ensure food safety and to prevent the spread of diseases among 
animals and plants (Simonetta Zarrilli, p.5). 
Besides, the SPS Agreement recognizes that, due to differences in geographical, climatic and 
epidemiological conditions in various countries and/or regions, it is often inappropriate to apply the 
same rules and standards to products with different origins. Therefore, the SPS Agreement presents 
a prospect for countries to apply different SPS measures depending on the origin of a certain product. 
However, such “flexibility” should not and cannot be used in any unjustified discrimination among 
foreign suppliers or in favor of one’s domestic producers (www.wto.org). 
If evaluated in real time context, both the TBT (16) and SPS standards are largely established 
by and for the developed countries, with little account being taken of developing countries’ 
implementation capacities. Developing countries have stated that in some instances importing 
countries are looking for “sameness”, instead of equivalency, of measures. On the other hand, the 
interpretation of equivalency as sameness is inconsistent with the Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement, 
which is to acknowledge that various measures can achieve the same level of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection and therefore, countries can enjoy flexibility about the kind of measures to 
adopt to ensure adequate SPS protection (Laird, p. 2)(17). 
                                                 
16 The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) typically deals with: 
-labeling of food, drink, and drugs 
-quality requirements for fresh food 
-packaging requirements for fresh food 
-packaging and labeling requirements for dangerous chemicals and toxic substances 
-regulations for electrical appliances 
-regulations for cordless phones, radio equipment, etc. 
-textiles and garments labeling 
-testing vehicles and accessories 
-regulations for ships and ship equipment 
-safety regulations for toys 
-etc… (see www.wto.org, WTO Agreement Series) 
 
17 Even though the SPS Agreement includes a specific Article (Article 10) on special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing 
countries and LDCs, the provisions of this article apparently have not been converted into specific obligations (Simonetta Zarrilli, 
WTO SPS Agreement: Issues for Developing Countries, p.10). 
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Agreements on TRIPS, GATS, and GPA 
One of the most groundbreaking and significant accomplishments of the Uruguay Round 
was the negotiation on the GATS, its associated annexes and national schedules of commitments. 
The negotiations resulted in a comprehensive set of rules for preserving and expanding market 
access for internationally traded services. The GATS provisions establish an across the board 
obligation on the transparency of laws and regulations affecting trade in services (Geza Feketekuty, 
p. 6-7) (18) 
Nevertheless, despite good intention to increase transparency, mobility, and tradability of the 
services in all areas for all members of the WTO, the problems do arise for the developing countries 
in this regard.  
The implementation of the GATS has indeed resulted in total and sharp growth in services. 
Yet, such growth has mainly occurred for the developed countries, which now accounts for 60-70 
percent of the GDP and employment in OECD countries (Jessica Woodroffe and Clare Joy, p.8). 
Furthermore, as provided by Raghavan, as early as in 1987, the European negotiators agreed on the 
fact they did not confirm or identify “comparative advantage for developing countries in any sector 
of services trade for the foreseeable future”. As a result Argentina’s claim that even after five years 
of GATS in action, developing countries had “failed to increase their share of global trade in 
services” did not come as a big surprise (Raghavan, p.108).  
Nonetheless, increasing the share of developing countries’ trade in services does not remain 
as the only puzzle. Thus, for instance, the so-called “brain drain” phenomenon is becoming 
increasingly important issue within the GATS framework. For example, some recent studies suggest 
that estimates indicate losses of 10 to 30 per cent and much more of the highly educated workforce 
                                                 
18 The GATS provisions establish an across the board obligation on the transparency of laws and regulations affecting trade in 
services. The transparency provision obligates member countries to publish all government measures, which affect trade in services, 
and to respond to requests for information on any of the above. The GATS agreement also establishes a general MFN obligation, i.e. 
countries are required to grant all foreign suppliers the same treatment, unless the country involved excluded a particular sector from 
the MFN obligation at the time the agreement went into effect. Members of a free trade area, however, are allowed to give each other 
preferential treatment. 
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from several developing countries (19). As a result, the developing countries are concerned that 
skilled labor emigration at such high levels poses a challenge for their own development (B. Lindsay 
Lowell and Allan Findlay, p.1) (20). 
The most direct effect of skilled labor emigration is a reduction in the number of educated 
workers who are critical to productivity and a developing country’s economic growth. On the other 
hand, as the forecasts of the cross-border labor movement suggest, it is more likely that at current 
demographic and economic trends/developments in advanced countries the immigrant admission 
numbers of skilled labor will continue to remain high. For example, in Bulgaria, about one-third of 
surveyed college students report intent to emigrate, while another research shows that about 12 
percent of Uruguay’s total professional class was lost during the 1980s, as well as that two-thirds of 
Jamaican nurses and 60 percent of the Philippine’s medical doctors have emigrated ( Lowell and 
Findlay, p.5) (21). 
Moreover, some developing countries are anxious about possible effects of fully opening up 
to foreign direct investment, a principal mode of supply for many services. Thus, developing 
countries try to press for wider liberalization beyond professional services, and it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to convince them that it is in their interest to take on new commitments in 
other areas of the services negotiations, since Article XIX:2 of the GATS provides 
“an appropriate flexibility for individual developing country Members for opening fewer 
sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, progressively extending market access in 
line with their development situation and, when making access to their markets available to 
                                                 
19 India has long been an important player in the global supply of professionals and students.  It is today’s most sought-after source 
country for highly skilled workers and most of the flow is to the United States. India has geared up quickly to meet demand in 
information technology, producing some 120,000 graduates a year with plans to double production.  Yet, there is an anticipatory 
theory that forecasts adverse long-term impacts from the export of IT workers where projected Indian shortages are greater than the 
forecast production of IT workers. Certainly research on specific sectors, e.g., medicine and engineering, raise concerns about adverse 
effects. The government perceives little problem with these trends, but the media decry the “brain drain”. Memoranda of 
understanding on student and academic exchange are an important way of addressing these issues (see Khadria, 2001). 
20 Jamaica and the Caribbean The 1962 British Commonwealth Act shifted emigration to North America. One-quarter of today’s 
outflow to the United States is made up of professional, technical, and kindred workers in the most productive age group. Emigration 
accelerated in the 1990s driven, in part, by recruitment “frenzy”.  Simultaneously, the return of low-skill UK retirees increased, as did 
non-Jamaican immigration, three- quarters of which is highly skilled. Still, there is a shortage of skilled workers. Two-thirds of 
Jamaica’s nurses emigrated over the past two decades and few return, in their place Cuban nurses are recruited. Feedback effects are 
few, i.e., remittances are uncertain and their most favourable impact is to stimulate house building.  While public opinion tends 
towards a favourable view of the inevitability of skilled outflows, the “brain drain” fuels negative perceptions of the region’s future.  
Policies have included readily accessible job information, tax concessions, and recruitment efforts including a short-lived IOM 
program to return expatriates (see Thomas-Hope, 2001). 
21 On average, 60-90 per cent of the price that tourists pay for their holidays goes to the multinationals who own the airlines and run 
the hotels. (Consumers International (2000), Services at the WTO Trade and Economics Briefing Paper, No.3.) 
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foreign service suppliers, attaching to it conditions aimed at achieving the objectives referred 
to in Article IV”,  
and conditions aimed at achieving are to increase participation of the developing countries in the 
world trade (22).    
The TRIPs covers seven main areas of intellectual property: copyright, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits, and 
undisclosed information including trade secrets. As explained by Finger, TRIPs also requires WTO 
members to provide for protection of plant varieties, “either by patent or by an effective sui generis 
system such as the plant breeder’s rights established in the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants convention” (Finger, p.429). Specified standards of protection for each area, 
which governments must provide, as well as the procedures to enforce them are clearly stipulated in 
the agreement. 
 While the enforcement provisions require that each member provides “civil as well as 
criminal remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights”, the member is also required to 
offer ways by which “rights holders can obtain the cooperation of customs authorities to prevent 
imports of infringing goods” (23). 
Despite the fact that the licensing and copyright protection in fact results in higher returns to 
knowledge generation and more innovations, the hard question is whether this growth is 
enjoyed/shared by both advanced countries and their developing colleagues or not? In reality, 
though, the rich countries are the net producers of patentable and certifiable knowledge and property, 
while the poorer ones are their net consumers.  
                                                 
22 GATS in action: Automobiles and Bananas 
The Canadian ‘Auto Pact’ is designed to encourage companies selling vehicles locally to invest in, purchase parts from, and create 
employment in Canada. This has been an important part of the country’s industrial strategy, but is exactly the kind of promotion of 
domestic industry that GATS seeks to remove. In 1999, European and Japanese vehicle manufactures challenged the Auto Pact. The 
WTO dispute panel ruled that it fell foul of a number of WTO agreements including GATS. 
European countries had given impoverished Caribbean banana farmers preferential access to their markets, until the US used GATS 
to have this discriminatory treatment ruled illegal under WTO rules. The EU had not thought to obtain an exception for the 
arrangement under GATS. (www.wto.org) 
23 www.wto.org 
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According to the survey, even in Mexico, an advanced developing country and the OECD 
member, domestic residents submitted only 389 patent applications in 1996, compared to over 
30,000 from foreign residents (Robert Hunter Wade, p. 4-5). 
For some developing countries the fact that full implementation of the TRIPs puts them in 
less favorable initial conditions for intellectual property and technology development seems unfair, 
since today’s advocates for the fullest TRIPs implementation - like EU, Japan, and the US, which by 
the World Bank estimates, would gain extra net US$19 billion a year in royalties from full 
application of TRIPs (24), had enjoyed unpatented, unlicensed and unrestricted intellectual property 
and technology use and developed at their initial stages of development in those areas (25). 
Furthermore, the developing countries have a wide array of obligations about what they 
allow to be patented and how they treat and enforce patents. In cases where a WTO member country 
does not comply with the rules and its obligations under the WTO, the probability that it will be 
brought to the dispute settlement panel by the advanced country-counterpart is very high. On the 
other hand, Article 67 of the TRIPs Agreement says, 
“developed country members must provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed 
country members” (26).  
However, since there is no provision for punishing developed countries if they do not 
comply with the above article, developing countries often receive an inadequate level of technical 
                                                 
24 ‘Intellectual property: balancing incentives with competitive access’, in Global Economic Prospects 2002, The World Bank, 
Washington DC, 2002, p.136. 
25 The TRIPS  agreement provided the following transition periods: 
. Industrial countries, until 1 January 1996 
. Developing countries and transition economies, up to 1 January 2000 
. Least developed countries, up to 1 January 2006— and may be extended on ‘‘duly motivated’’ request by a least developed country 
Developing countries that now provide patent protection to processes and not to products, for example, in the food, chemical, and 
pharmaceutical sectors, can delay the application of the obligation to protect products up to 1 January 2005. Even here, governments 
must specify that inventions made between 1995 and 2004 will be able to gain patent protection after 1 January 2005. 
 
26 The World Trade Oeganization website: 
 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_08_e.htm#art67  
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support from their advanced counterparts.  
Besides, because TRIPs builds on international conventions, which were created mainly by 
the industrial countries and practice the enforcement methods they draw on, it is often very 
burdensome and costly for the developing countries to meet and fully comply with the TRIPs 
obligations. 
The Agreement of Government Procurement  
The main goal of the GPA is to ensure that government decisions regarding government 
purchases of goods and services do not depend upon where the good is produced or the service 
rendered, or upon the supplier's foreign affiliations. Thus, the foreign firms must be treated 
identically as the domestic ones and the government should not provide any more preferential 
treatment to the local producer, supplier, or manufacturer in any case, even if intended to promote or 
support certain domestic industry.  
In reality though, protectionist and nationalistic attitudes are more popular among the general 
public. Hence, often populist governments have to implement the policies, which might be less 
economically efficient yet more public support gaining. As a result, for instance, the claim that “our 
money” should be spent on “our goods” to keep “jobs at home” led to exclusion of the government 
procurement issue from the original GATT. Indeed, it was not until the completion of the Tokyo 
Round that an agreement on disciplines for government procurement practices was introduced into 
the world trading system (Evenett, p.6).  
The European Union estimates that the public procurement marketplace at all levels of 
government in member states equals to about US$1,000 billion annually. The United States spend 
about US$200 billion annually at the federal level and another US$400 billion is estimated to be 
spent at the state and local level (Wittig, p.8). Trionfetti indicates that the size of central government 
purchases varies between 5 percent and 8 percent of the GDP for most industrialized countries. For 
the Middle East and Africa, the size of central government purchases ranges from between 9 and 13 
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percent of the GDP (Trionfetti, p.47) (27). 
It is perfectly understandable that since government procurement accounts for a fairly large 
share of the GDP, that the countries involved try to secure this area spending for their domestic 
companies and businesses. Sensibly, the developing countries would more likely to continue to 
avoid becoming a party to the GPA, despite a substantial pressure from the EU, the US, and other 
GPA members, to accede to the WTO GPA. Furthermore, such players as the EU and the US would 
continue to push for the multilateralization of the GPA in the future. For instance, even today, the 
US legislation requires the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to monitor foreign 
procurement policies that deny access to markets for American goods and services. Such data is 
published on an annual base in the US Department of Trade’s Foreign Trade Barriers Report (28). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the GPA is a “plurilateral agreement” and is signed on a voluntary 
base by each member country, still the pressure for a “multilateral” GPA is sizable. Such opponents 
of the GPA as Egypt and Pakistan are still worried that by signing themselves to the GPA rules and 
requirements, their domestic industries will loose the competition to the large, well experienced 
foreign companies.    
Assesment 
According to classical trade theory, transition from a closed economy to a free trade results 
in many economic gains since trading countries benefit from specialization and more efficient 
resource allocation. Probably, the idea to receive such trade-generated benefits is the force that 
stimulates the world community to make repeated steps toward further trade liberalization, which 
also involves getting a WTO membership for some.  
                                                 
27 Governments also use procurement policies to favour certain groups, firms, regions, and industries. For example, such favoritism 
is widespread in the United States and India where the central government favors small firms who bid for contracts. More recently, 
South Africa has considered instituting a scheme which will favour black entrepreneurs and firms that employ stipulated numbers of 
black employees. This is part of a sweeping initiative to enhance the economic status of the majority black population after the fall of 
the apartheid regime (see Evenett, p.9). 
28 USTR Annual Report on Discrimination in Foreign Government Procurement http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/report.pdf 
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Nevertheless, due to the difficulties and multiples of obstacles faced by the pooper nations, 
and questionable willingness of the rich countries to address these concerns, there is often a doubt 
about the WTO's ability to integrate development into its main targets and plans.  
Along the evolution of the GATT and later formation of the WTO, developing countries 
have criticized the GATT/WTO system for its perceived bias in favor of the industrialized nations 
(29). Thus, developing nations have criticized the new set of commitments, which range from the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights to customs policy reform, that were discussed during the 
Uruguay Round because their full implementation remains too costly for them. The problem of high 
implementation costs is coupled with the belief that the WTO has failed to deliver promised gains to 
the poor countries in such important areas as textiles and agriculture, where tariff reductions have 
been slower than in industrial sectors.  
Hence, the poor states believe that the pattern of protectionism in favor of the rich and is 
biased against the poor since the trade barriers for and on the goods produced by those poor are 
among the highest. In addition, “participation constraint”, among which small and unexperienced 
Geneva Permanent Mission delegations, inability to fully participate in many important WTO issue 
meetings, and poor domestic inter-agency work organization, hinders developing countries from 
ensuring that WTO agenda items and multilateral rules reflect their strategic interests and needs. 
Many low-income countries are fearful of the possible implications of trade liberalization for 
them. The main reason to such fear is the lack of understanding and assistance on behalf of the 
developed nations to make sure that all of the WTO rules, regulations and obligations that come 
with them, make clear sense and are understood by the developing countries. Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier in the paper, the problem of “unfamiliarity,” of not only developed countries’ 
                                                 
29 At the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference, several groups of developing countries released statements criticizing their exclusion 
from key decision-making processes at the WTO. Ministers from African, Latin American and Caribbean nations, for example, 
complained that they were not allowed to participate in "green rooms," or the informal negotiating groups where sensitive issues were 
discussed. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, these concerns were less pronounced, but frustration about unequal 
representation remained (www.wto.org) 
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government officials but also the private sector and civil society, with the real situation and hot 
issues in the developing countries, result in lack of understanding and communication between the 
two. Besides, despite the fact that the Doha Declaration provides a number of commitments on the 
part of the WTO members to provide technical assistance in the areas of investment and competition, 
there is an absence of similar procedures in the areas of market access, government procurement and 
trade facilitation (30). 
Nevertheless, since it is in the developing countries own interest to have strong and effective 
WTO multilateral trading system, it should also be in their interest not to simply be a part to new 
multilateral trade talks and give their comments on suggested proposals by the developed members, 
but to take an initiative that would let them create such policies which are beneficial for them too, 
and to pursue outcomes that can accelerate growth of international trade in general, while increasing 
developing countries’  access to the advanced countries’ markets. 
To do so, developing countries need to reach a consensus among themselves first, and turn 
into a more active, informed WTO player, which will be able to participate in the discussions and 
proceedings of the WTO to make sure that “emerging interpretations and practices concerning 
provisions in the agreement do not result in either an increase in obligations or dilution of their 
rights” (Mathur, p.46). They also should not be in denial about the necessity to address new issues in 
areas such as investment, competition policies, trade in services, standards and GPA. 
On the other hand, it is evident that every coin has two sides, so it is not solely developing 
countries actions, which can increase the level of cooperation and further development process in 
                                                 
30 DOHA  MINISTERIAL DECLARATION (adopted November 14, 2001) Technical cooperation and capacity building  
“38.  We confirm that technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral 
trading system, and we welcome and endorse the New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation for Capacity Building, Growth and 
Integration. We instruct the Secretariat, in coordination with other relevant agencies, to support domestic efforts for mainstreaming 
trade into national plans for economic development and strategies for poverty reduction. The delivery of WTO technical assistance 
shall be designed to assist developing and least-developed countries and low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules 
and disciplines, implement obligations and exercise the rights of membership, including drawing on the benefits of an open, rules-
based multilateral trading system. Priority shall also be accorded to small, vulnerable, and transition economies, as well as to 
members and observers without representation in Geneva. We reaffirm our support for the valuable work of the International Trade 
Centre, which should be enhanced. 
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the global trade framework, but also developed countries’ degree and interest to contribute to it that 
completes the job. Thus, rich WTO members should provide greater technical and other possible 
means of support, so they can assist developing countries in their trade liberalization and integration 
processes.  
If we go back to the main question posed in the paper, of the degree of difficulties 
developing countries face while integrating into the world trading system, the answer consists of two 
components. First, while it is undoubtful that the accession process into the WTO is both time and 
money consuming, there are many factors to such obstacles. For example, high WTO rules and 
regulations implementation costs, lack of professional, well trained and experienced personnel, lack 
of sufficient financial resources, besides those allocated for the development projects, in total all of 
the abovementioned negatively affect the timing and effectiveness of the WTO accession by a new 
member.  
On the other hand, such factors as political instability and lack of political will to push for 
liberal reform commitments also become impediments, not less important or less significant than the 
technical ones, in joining the global trading system. 
Nevertheless, despite some free trade opponents’ argument that the WTO had failed to 
achieve its main goal, the most important goal of this organization has been and is being achieved. 
Thus, the reciprocal removal of barriers to trade in goods and services has been taking place since 
the formation of the GATT and has intensified with the creation of the WTO. Therefore, it is not a 
question of joining or not joining the WTO, but rather a question of assessing costs and benefits and 
trying to choose a less burdensome pace for each individual country and case.  
Indeed, because the benefits of globalization and the gains of increased global integration are 
unevenly distributed across and within nations, the reforms required for wider benefit enjoyment 
will become even greater as the current and future rounds of WTO multilateral trade negotiations 
continue. Consequently, more education is needed for the developing countries not only about the 
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WTO, its rules, regulations and obligations but also in analytical capacity and skills so more trade 
liberalization among the developed countries as well as some developing countries will be possible. 
PART II  
Case Study – Economic and Political Perspectives on Kazakhstan’s WTO Accession  
INTRODUCTION: 
 In the second Part of the thesis I would like to use the case of the Republic of Kazakhstan’s 
accession negotiations process as an illustrative example of WTO accession by a developing country. 
One of the reason I chose Kazakhstan’s WTO accession is because I believe that Kazakhstan, 
despite its developing country status, is facing rather distinctive experience of WTO accession 
negotiations and of domestic policy restructuring. The main reason to the difference is certainly the 
timing of the accession. First of all, even though Kazakhstan is by rational thinking is a developing 
country, it is recognized as a country with a “market economy” both by the USA and the EC. This 
fact does not allow Kazakhstan to enjoy special and preferential treatment provisions for countries 
in “transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy31.” Moreover, the special treatment 
provisions envisaged for developing and least-developed countries in case of “balance-of-payment” 
difficulties are as well not applicable to Kazakhstan, as its balance of payment has been in surplus 
for several years. 
Secondly, with the erosion of preferences in terms of special tariff concessions granted by 
developed countries on imports from developing countries, the real gains developing countries 
receive from such provisions are much less substantial nowadays from what it used to be. The 
reason is that with the overall reduction of normal tariff rates the difference between the “normal” 
and “preferential” rates is significantly cut. 
                                                 
31 Pomfret, Richard, “Reintegration Of Formerly Centrally Planned Economies Into The Global Trading System,” Center For 
International Economic Studies, Discussion Paper 0106, February 2001, p.5  
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  Of course, there are number of other provisions intended to assist developing countries. For 
example, provision of Article XVIII of GATT allows developing countries to withdraw previous 
commitments such as tariff bindings in order to protect infant industries, and provision of 
permissible subsidies for the agricultural sector envisaged under Article VI of the Agriculture 
Agreement32. There are several special treatment provisions in WTO agreements, which provide 
extended implementation periods for developing countries’ various commitments33.   
Yet, the main problem concerning special and differential treatment is that they are not 
compulsory or not legally enforceable. Thus, for example, GATT’s special section (Part IV) on 
Trade and Development contains provisions on the concept of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations 
between developed and developing countries, meaning that when developed countries grant trade 
concessions to developing countries they should not expect the developing countries to make 
matching offers in return. In reality though, the question of providing special treatment to a certain 
developing country is a matter of political reasoning rather than of developed country’s good 
intention to do so. The provision of more favorable treatment to the developing countries was quite 
important during the Cold War era, when western industrialized countries were eager to provide 
assistance, both technical and financial to their poorer counterparts, so they could secure their 
control over countries they subsidized. 
Since the end of the Cold War and as a result of speedy development and expansion of 
Chinese economy in particular, the developed countries are no longer willing to provide a full range 
of special and differential treatment provisions to the developing world, except for the least-
developed countries, many of which have long been WTO members as a result of de facto GATT 
                                                 
32 In accordance with Paragraph 4 (a) (i) of the Article VI of Agreement on Agriculture for developed WTO member country 
“product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be included in a Member's calculation of its Current AMS 
…should not exceed 5 percent of that Member's total value of production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year.” Yet 
for developing countries in accordance with the Para. 4 (b) de minimis permissible subsidies of 10 percent of the total value of 
production are allowed. 
33 The Special treatment provisions, which foresee extended implementation periods to developing countries are those under Article 
15 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 10 of the SPS Agreement, Article 12 of the TBT Agreement, Article 27 of the SCM 
Agreement, etc. 
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membership provision for post-colonial countries, but who failed to achieve increase in trade 
surpluses or greater economic growth34. 
Due to the fact that reliance and exercise of special and differential treatment by the 
developing countries nowadays is becoming less and less effective, while negotiations for the right 
to enjoy them are indeed becoming more and more time consuming, as well as since many special 
and preferential treatment provisions have already or are going to expire soon due to the expiration 
of the ten-year transitional period from GATT to WTO on January 1, 2005, I would argue that in 
case of Kazakhstan’s WTO negotiations on its concessions, the country should not rely or depend on 
the special treatment provisions, as they do not bring much benefit, but should rather try to 
incorporate into the global trading system by facing the reality.  
In other words, it is better for the country to put as much effort and political commitment as 
possible to adjust its institutional and legal basis in compliance with the WTO rules and 
requirements at the earliest stage possible, since further delays would require more dramatic/larger 
adjustments, while temporary prolongations in deadlines for the implementation of the country’s 
obligations cannot be sustained forever.   
Despite that, the perception that the WTO is largely “an instrument of the powerful, 
industrialized nations” is widely popular and is true to certain extend. Yet, according to Kaushik 
Basu, the Cornell University economics professor, “opposing it on all fronts, however, is 
wrong…(since) constant opposition to the WTO is self-defeating.35” He argues that in “today's 
globalized world a centralized trade ombudsman is vital.” Basu compares WTO to a law court, and 
its elimination to “trying to run a modern society without a law court,” which despite its typical 
leniency towards the rich and powerful, is still better than chaos.  
                                                 
34 Hayashi Michiko, “Arrested Development: Vanuatu’s Suspended Accession to the World Trade Organization”, Case Study 
Prepared for the International Commercial Diplomacy Project, February 2003, 
http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/case_study/vanuatu.html 
35 Basu, Kaushik, “The Retreat of Global Democracy”, September, 2001, p.3  
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Thus, I do not cross out the possibility of someone arguing that rapid liberalization and 
domestic market opening to foreign trade can and probably will worsen the situation for country’s 
domestic industries by flooding domestic markets with low priced imports as a result of low tariffs 
and quantitative and administrative restrictions elimination. Yet, I believe that worsening of the 
situation for the domestic producers will only be true during the period immediately after the 
country’s WTO accession. 
While, on the long run, liberalization of domestic economy, implementation of civilized 
business conduct rules as well as institutional, professional and legal system development, will 
result in more efficient economy with competitive domestic industries and producers. On the other 
hand, I would like to stress that such positive outcomes are only possible if the country clearly 
realizes and assesses its current political and economic situation, understands all of the aspects of 
WTO rules and regulations, and if it has affirmative, carefully planned plan of restructuring its 
economy to meet international standards, which at the same time will cause a minimal domestic 
damage from adjustments. The political commitment of the country’s leadership and business elites 
is also crucial for a successful WTO accession and post-accession development.    
Therefore, I would like to assess Kazakhstan’s current standing on such major WTO issues 
as intellectual property rights protection, trade in services and government procurement. I believe 
that these agreements appear to be more complex and need more understanding on behalf of WTO 
acceding country. According to my observation there is not enough available information on 
Kazakhstan’s current standing on these matters.  
  Since independence, Kazakhstan has been perceived globally as a supplier of oil, gas, ferrous, 
non-ferrous, rare earth and noble metals and uranium products, grain being a potentially exportable 
agricultural product. So far Kazakhstan has been developing pursuant to a classical economic 
scenario due to comparative economic advantage of rich mineral resources endowment. 
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Nevertheless, according to the President’s Long –Term Development Strategy of 
Kazakhstan - “Kazakhstan-2030,” the Government's short-term “Development Program for 2002-
2004,” and the country’s “Innovative- Industrial Development Strategy for 2003-2015,” 
Kazakhstan is committed to pursue the economic policy aimed to support sustainable development 
through non-extraction oriented diversification of the economy. Production of competitive and 
export oriented goods and services in processing industries and services is the major focus of the 
state’s innovative-industrial development policy. 
As highlighted by the country’s leadership, under current globalisation trends Kazakhstan’s 
future economic and political development is confronted with a number of challenges. Among 
which high dependency on mineral-resources extraction and exports, weak integration into the 
global economy, inefficiency and slow-tempo transition to service and technology oriented economy, 
weak inter-sectoral and interregional economic integration within the country, general technical and 
technological obsolescence of enterprises, lack of efficient connection between science and 
production, low expenditures for scientific research and engineering works (SREW) 36. 
Yet, in order to achieve set goals in reality and not only on paper, the adequate policy 
adjustments should take place. The second part of the thesis thereby will provide an evaluation of 
what has already been done in terms of institutional and policy changes, and what Kazakhstan still 
needs to do so it can achieve its set goals and effectively access WTO, which will be its next step 
towards deeper international integration.    
  
BACKGROUND: 
Geographic location: 
                                                 
36 “The Innovative-Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan For 2003-2015” approved by the Decree of the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 17, 2003, No.1096 
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Kazakhstan is the largest of the Central Asia Republics, covering 2.73 million square 
kilometers (i.e. 1.05 mln. sq miles). It is bordered by Russia to the north, the Caspian Sea to the 
south-west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to the south, and China to the east.  
It possesses enormous fossil fuel reserves as well as plentiful supplies of other minerals and 
metals. It also is a large agricultural - livestock and grain - producer. Kazakhstan is among top world 
countries in the amount of proven reserves of oil and gas, and the potential for new findings. It has 
10 to 22 billion barrels of proven crude reserves and 53 to 83 trillion ft3 of gas (1998 est.)37. The 
most significant growth of hydrocarbon extraction should be expected due to resources of 
Kazakhstan sector of the Caspian Sea with the hydrocarbon reserves estimated at a total of 8.0 
billion tones. In the future the off-shore oil extraction may amount to 150-200 million tones for 25-
30 years onwards38. 
Among other important resources are copper, lead, zinc, and silver, tungsten and tin, 
chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, titanium, magnesium, and antimony, vanadium, and gold. Processing 
facilities at Aktau produce large quantities of uranium mined in the Manghyshlak area. 
Molybdenum, tungsten, phosphorus, copper, cadmium and bauxites add to the list of Kazakhstan's 
mineral resources39.  
 
Political and economic situation: 
Since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has been one of the earliest and most vigorous 
reformers among the countries of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the transition costs of 
moving from a centrally planned to a market economy have been high. With the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, Kazakhstan experienced an acute drop in output in almost all sectors of the economy, 
which resulted in economy’s contraction, with the steepest annual decline occurring in 1994. Such 
                                                 
37 General Information On Kazakhstan, CIA World Fact Book, August 1, 2003, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kz.html 
38 Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Basic Information On The Republic Of Kazakhstan 
39 “About Kazakhstan,” Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Center, KazInvest, http://www.kazinvest.kz/english/kazakhstan_eng.html  
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drastic economic decline was a combined outcome of several factors such as sharp demand drop for 
Kazakhstan's traditional heavy industry products, large volume of non-payments between enterprises, 
shrinkage of investments, and overall decrease of the population’s incomes.  
 Kazakhstan’s economy of the early 1990s was characterized by severe drop in production, a 
breakdown of the monetary and credit systems, loss of stability of the ruble, which led to further 
problems of delays in salary and pension pays, empty counters and long waiting lines as a result of 
both deficit in consumer goods and their distribution by coupons. In 1992 and 1993, prices inflated 
3.060 and 2.265 percent respectively40.  
 Despite all of the difficulties and complications the Government started to gradually 
introduce reforms necessary for the transition to a market economy. National currency, Tenge, and 
new macroeconomic policies were introduced in November of 1993. Thus, trade distortions were 
gradually reduced, while prices were liberalized, and small and medium-scale enterprises were 
privatized. In the period of 1995-97, the pace of the economic reforms and privatization gained 
speed, resulting in a substantial shifting of assets into the private sector.  
 Yet, Kazakhstan's economy again turned downward in 1998 with a 2% decline in GDP due 
to slumping oil prices and the August Financial Crisis in Russia. Recovery of international oil prices 
in 1999, combined with well-timed Tenge devaluation and a bumper grain harvest, pulled the 
economy out of recession in 2000. 
 The government established a basic framework to attract foreign direct investment into its 
resource rich oil and mineral sectors. Banking reforms and an ambitious pension reform program 
followed, together with the unbundling of the electricity sector. The pension reform program was 
introduced in 1998, and by December 2002, Kazakhstan’s population had contributed over US$1.6 
billion to their own personal pension accounts, 71 percent of which is managed by the private 
                                                 
40 Zhunisbekova, Lyazzat, “Addressing Intellectual Property Rights Reforms in Kazakhstan,” Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, April, 1999 
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sector41. Furthermore, the growth of the pension funds triggered the development of the debt 
securities market in the country. Pension fund capital is being invested almost exclusively in 
corporate and government bonds, including Government of Kazakhstan Eurobonds. 
 More recently, a framework for public resource management was introduced. The framework 
includes foundations for civil service and creation of the National Fund to save part of the inflows to 
the budget from oil and other extractive industry. The National Fund is based on the Norway model, 
and accumulates extra profits of the oil and gas sector, when the oil export price rises over USD19 
per barrel42. The National Bank manages the fund’s assets and together with the Government 
prepares annual plan for the effective management of the fund.  In 2002 the National Bank declared 
tenders to select additional external managers of the Fund’s fixed income securities mandate. Union 
Bank Privee and ABN AMRO Asset Management were selected as the managers. While, Citigroup 
Asset Management was picked for the management of the Fund’s equalization portfolio43. 
 Kazakhstan embarked upon an industrial policy designed to diversify the economy away 
from dependence on the oil sector by developing light industry. Economic policy was aimed at 
maintaining price levels at the given limits. Kazakhstan's monetary policy has been well managed. 
From mid-1999 there were no abrupt price increases in Kazakhstan's economy. Stabilization of the 
financial market made it possible for the National Bank to lower official re-financing rate from 18 
percent to 7.5 percent by the end of 2002, and to 7 percent in July 200344. Competitiveness of the 
domestic producers increased, investment activity enhanced and business finances improved.  
 As a result of its strong macroeconomic performance and financial health, Kazakhstan 
became the first former Soviet country to repay all of its debt to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 2000, 7 years ahead of the schedule. In March 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
                                                 
41 The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Statistics On Labor Market and Pension Reform, 
http://www.enbek.kz/almaz1/rynok_rs/rynoc.php 
42 The Decrees of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan “About the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan” dated 
August 23, 2000 No. 402 
43 Annual Report of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, p.43 http://195.239.180.20/cont/publish577190_665.pdf   
44 The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Main Macro Economic Indicators, www.nationalbank.kz 
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graduated Kazakhstan to market economy status under U.S. trade law. The change in status 
recognized substantive market economy reforms in the areas of currency convertibility, wage rate 
determination, openness to foreign investment, and government control over the means of 
production and allocation of resources. In September 2002, Kazakhstan became the first country in 
the former Soviet Union to receive an investment-grade credit rating from a major international 
credit rating agency. As of October 1, 2003, Kazakhstan's gross foreign debt was at about $19.8 
billion, $3.03 billion of which was owed by the government.45  
 In 2001 the highest economic growth rate ever was reached since 1991; it equaled to 13.5 
percent with an output increase in the main sectors of the economy such as industry, construction, 
transport, communications and trade. The upturn in economic growth, combined with the results of 
earlier tax and financial sector reforms, dramatically improved government finances from the 1999 
budget deficit level of 3.5percent of GDP to a surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP in 2001. GDP growth 
of 9.5 percent was achieved in 2002. The 2002 average annual inflation was at 5.9 percent (vs. 8.4 
percent in 2001)46. Trade turnover in 2002 grew by 8% in comparison with 2001, exceeding 
US$16,2 billion, of which exports accounted for over US$9,7 (growth by 12%) billion, while 
imports for US$6,5 (growth by 2%)47. The state budget as of January 1, 2003 experienced a small 
profit of 0.03% of the GDP48.  
 Kazakhstan’s banking system is developing rapidly. During 2002 deposits of residents in the 
banking system grew up by 35.6% and reached 603.3 billion Tenge (foreign 
currency equivalent – about 3.9 billion USD) accounting for 16.1% GDP (in 2001 – 13.7%)49. The 
National Bank has introduced deposit insurance in its campaign to strengthen the banking sector. 
                                                 
45 The national Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan www.nationalbank.kz 
46 Annual Report of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, p. 3 
http://195.239.180.20/cont/publish577190_665.pdf 
47 Top Trading Partners with Kazakhstan: Russia, US, UK, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Japan, Germany, Italy, Switzerland. 
48 Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Main Socio Economic Indicators, www.stat.kz 
49 Annual Report of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, p. 20 
http://195.239.180.20/cont/publish577190_665.pdf  
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The system of mortgage lending is developed and implemented by Kazakhstan Mortgage Company 
CJSC (KMC)50. KMC provides refinancing of mortgage loans for purchase, both at the primary and 
secondary markets, and refurbishment of housing. Kazakhstan is the first country in CIS to issue and 
place mortgage bonds. The Government believes that emergence of a principally new instrument at 
domestic stock market will give an additional impetus to its development. 
 There are 33 private banks, of which 16 are foreign banks such as ABN AMRO, Citibank, 
SBC, and others, operating in Kazakhstan. In 1993 there were 230 private banks, yet 110 were 
liquidated and others closed down themselves, as they did not have the capacities to operate51. 
Competition in the banking and financial sector continues to increase, particularly from foreign 
banks, but also from domestic private pension funds, which create strong demand for domestic 
bonds and therefore compete with banks in lending.  
 Net foreign direct investment between the years of 1993 to 2002 has equaled to US$21.2 
billion. Major volume of foreign direct investment was attracted into the oil and gas sectors, which 
are leading sectors of the economy. In 2002, Kazakhstan produced 47.232 million metric tons of oil 
and gas condensate (945,000 barrels/day), an 18 percent increase over 2001's 39.97 million tons. 
The year 2002 oil exports reached 39.4 million tons of oil, which is 32.4 percent more than in the 
preceding year. Natural gas output in 2002 equaled 13.137 billion cubic meters, which is a 13.2 
percent increase from the year 2001 levels52.  
 In general, the country possesses around 2.5 percent of proven recoverable world oil reserves. 
Industry analysts believe that planned expansion of oil production, coupled with the development of 
new fields, will enable the country to produce as much as 3 million barrels per day by 2015, lifting 
Kazakhstan into the ranks of the world's top 10 oil-producing nations. Kazakhstan's 2002 oil exports 
                                                 
50 In accordance with the National Bank’s license dated September 28, 2002 “The Kazakhstan Mortgage Company” CJSC operations 
include lending, security issuance and factoring 
51 Interview of the Chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan Mr. G. Marchenko to the Prime-Tass Agency   
http://www.prime-tass.ru/free/interview/20030918.shtm 
52 Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Annual Report, www.stat.kz  
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valued more than US$5 billion, representing 43 percent of overall exports and 21 percent of the 
GDP. Major oil and gas fields and their recoverable oil reserves are Tengiz (7 billion barrels); 
Karachaganak (8 billion barrels and 1,350 billion cubic meters of natural gas); and Kashagan (7-9 
billion barrels). 
 The USA is a leading investor in Kazakhstan’s economy with a total investment of US$ 6.6 
billion. The overall investment share division is as follows: the US 24.7%, Great Britain (15.3%), 
Switzerland (12.8%), Italy (11.5%), Netherlands (9.9), Russia (5.3%) and Canada (4 %)53.  
 The government has now embarked on a tight fiscal policy and loose monetary policy mix in 
an attempt to increase investment in the non-oil sector. The governmental program of the Industrial-
Innovative Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, intended to develop and promote non oil 
and gas sectors, as well as stipulate the development of domestic scientific, information technology, 
and innovation based industry base, has been designed and is now at its first stage of implementation.  
In overall, in the last several years the government has embarked on ambitious private pension 
reform, carried out successful privatization program, established a strong banking sector, created an 
emergency reserve – the National Fund, was recognized as the country with “market economy” both 
by the US and the EU, repaid its state foreign debt to the IMF seven years ahead of the schedule, 
Moody’s Investors upgraded Kazakhstan's foreign currency ceiling for bonds and the rating of the 
government's foreign currency bonds to Baa3 and for the ceiling for foreign currency bank deposits 
to Ba154. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services raised its long-term foreign currency ratings of 
Kazakhstan to BB+, and its local currency ratings to `BBB-/A-3`, and thus became the first CIS 
country to upgrade into the “investment” category credit rating both from Moody’s and the S&P.  
 
KAZAKHSTAN AND WTO 
                                                 
53 Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Center 
http://www.kazinvest.kz/english/document_eng.asp?id=21 
54 Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Center  
http://www.kazinvest.kz/english/document_eng.asp?id=19 
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“The sphere of trade should become a major ground, which will foster industrial and innovative development. Due 
to that trade policy of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be aimed at creation of conditions for 
development of competition, which is the main mechanism of market economy self-regulation.  
 Further protection of the market from imports leads to hopeless lagging of domestic manufacture goods behind 
their foreign analogues in terms of both price and consumer characteristics” –  
The Innovative – Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
 
The accession process 
The Kazakhstan’s WTO Accession Working Party was established on 6 February 1996 after 
Kazakhstan’s formal application for WTO membership. The General Council appointed Bjorn 
Eckblum, Permanent Representative of Finland to the WTO, as the Chairman of the Working Party 
for Kazakhstan.  
In accordance with the Government’s Decree No.211 dated February 19, 1996 “an inter-
agency commission” under the Ministry of Economy and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan was 
created to coordinate the WTO accession negotiation process. The Foreign Trade Regime 
Memorandum detailing Kazakhstan’s foreign trade regime and including statistical data, was 
submitted to the WTO Secretariat in June 1996. 
The first bilateral negotiation talks took place on March 19, 1997 in Geneva. Topics under 
discussion in the Working Party include: agriculture, the customs system (and customs union 
arrangements), price controls, import licensing, industrial subsidies, SPS and TBT, transparency of 
the legal system and legislative reform, services and TRIPS. 
Such WTO member countries as Australia, Canada, Cuba, the EU, Finland, the US, Japan, 
India, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Great Britain, Poland, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Germany, and France, took part at the negotiations55. Kazakhstan’s negotiation delegation consisted 
                                                 
55 Countries with WTO observer status that attended the meeting were Algeria, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, and Ukraine. International organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and UNCTAD were also present . 
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of nine officials and was headed at that time Deputy Minister of Energy, Industry and Trade Mrs. 
Zhanat Ertlesova56.  
The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan submitted a plan for future legislative 
reforms that will bring the country into compliance with WTO requirements. The United States 
asked Kazakhstan to submit a list of commodities that need to be brought into compliance with the 
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures within a certain time period. The United 
States also emphasized that Kazakhstan may not use Article XXIX of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Article 29 allows Members that are “in the process of 
transformation from a centrally-planned into a market, free-enterprise economy” to phase out 
subsidies falling within the scope of Article III of this Agreement within a period of seven years 
from the date of enforcement of the WTO Agreement57. Instead, the United States requested that 
Kazakhstan submit a list of subsidies that are not in compliance with the WTO Agreement and the 
time schedule for their gradual elimination.  
Since the initial bilateral negotiations four more meetings took place, the fifth meeting of 
the Working Party on the accession of Kazakhstan to WTO, took place on December 10-13 2002 in 
Geneva. The WTO members, which participate in the negotiations – the USA, the EU, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Poland, Bulgaria, Latvia, Georgia, Turkey, Brazil, Cuba and 
Mexico, praised Kazakhstan’s commitment to the market economy principles and its progress in 
trade liberalization. They discussed Kazakhstan’s measures and successes in bringing domestic 
legislation and its foreign trade regime in conformity with the WTO rules and requirements. The 
                                                 
56 Zhunisbekova, Lyazzat Addressing Intellectual Property Rights Reforms in Kazakhstan, Monterey Institute of International Studie
s, April, 1999 
57 Janow, Merit E., The Benefits of WTO Competition Principles for Developing Countries, Paper prepared for WTO symposium on 
competition policy, April 22, 2001 
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questions related to Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector and the measures of its support were also 
mentioned58.  
The Government of the country is committed to join WTO in a near future. As a result, it 
has intensified the WTO accession process by accelerating the bilateral negotiation talks with other 
trade partners-WTO members. For instance, at the end of April 2003, the Kazakhstani delegation 
headed by the Vice Minister of Industry and Trade Mr. Galym Orazbakov met with Director 
General of the Economic Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of 
Canada Mr. Brian Morrisay 59 . They touched upon the questions regarding Kazakhstan’s 
participation in the Common Economic Space (CES) formed by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. The questions of market access for the goods and services based on the tariff rate 
suggestions presented by Kazakhstan to Canada in April of this year, as well as technical barriers in 
trade and investments were also discussed. Moreover, during the negotiations Canada’s 
representatives provided their suggestions on clarifying the measures and procedures of 
standardization and certification. Thus, they advised the Kazakhstani side to increase transparency 
and clarity of the relevant legislation and continue to harmonize standards and requirements in 
certification and standardization in the CES, as well as to establish Information Center on 
Standardization and Certification, based on the goods listed as mandatory for certification. 
The Kazakhstani delegation also met with the US trade department officials and held 
negotiations on the transition period for the SPS agreement requirements implementation, TRIPs, 
TRIMs, subsidies and countervailing duties, as well as Kazakhstan’s obligations in the agrarian 
sector.  
                                                 
58 KazInform News Agency, www.nkkazinform.kz 
59 Negotiations on Kazakhstan's accession to the World Trade Organization, Kazakhstan’s Permanent Mission In 
Geneva, News Archive, Press Release, 16 July 2003 http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/eng/archive/0307/index.htm 
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Recent multilateral and bilateral talks between Kazakhstan and WTO member countries at 
Geneva, headed by the Minister of Industry and Trade of Kazakhstan - Mr. Adilbek Jaksybekov, 
once again highlighted “strong political will of the country’s leadership to continue an intensive 
preparation to accede to WTO.60” Evidently, it is becoming clearer that the country has regained its 
interest in accessing to WTO, and has intensified the negotiation process, which has been very 
ineffective and slow so far61.  
The reason for such “awakening” is probably due to the fact that the leadership of the 
country has realized that greater and further economic liberalization and reforming of any country 
and Kazakhstan, which due to its geographical location as well as its rich oil and gas resources has 
major significance to the rest of the world, in particular, is inevitable in the contemporary world. 
Thus, the President and the Government decided to make use of the preparatory period for WTO 
accession as effectively and efficiently as possible, through faster implementation of adequate 
legislation and implementation of international standards for all sectors of the economy.  
Benefits of acceding to the WTO 
If carefully accessed and evaluated Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO will be beneficial 
for the country. Despite the fact that removal of the trade barriers such as high tariffs, preferential 
treatment of certain trading partners and subsidies in particular sector of the economy, will probably 
have a negative immediate result after WTO accession, the development of internal institutions and 
legislation, bringing the domestic production and control of goods to international standards, 
protecting intellectual property and copyright, as well as reducing the role of the government in the 
economy will have its positive effect for the country’s future development. 
                                                 
60“5th meeting of the Working Party on the accession of Kazakhstan to WTO,” December 13, 2002, Press Release, The Website Of 
The Government of Kazakhstan, 
http://www.government.kz/pls/portal30/PORTAL30.wwv_media.show?p_id=19490&p_currcornerid=19197&p_settingssetid=1372&
p_settingssiteid=33&p_siteid=33&p_type=text&p_textid=19491   
61Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN Office and Other International Organizations at Geneva, Information 
On Kazakhstan’s WTO Accession Status, http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/  
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More specifically, the membership of the WTO would give the country the following 
advantages: 
- access to new markets for exporting goods and services; 
- introduction of non-discriminatory trade regime for goods in the markets of importer 
countries; 
- more attractive, stable and predictable conditions for investments; 
- broader assortment of better quality of goods and services at lower prices for consumers; 
- access to an efficient dispute settlement mechanism; 
- bringing trade, investment and customs regulations into accord with international standards; 
- freedom of transit through territories of WTO member countries; 
- better access to world market information. 
 
ISSUES - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) 
TRIPs - Situation With The Intellectual Property Rights Protection After The 
Breakdown Of The USSR 
In socialist countries, new knowledge was perceived as belonging to the whole of society, 
which had, after all, paid for the research that produced the new knowledge in the first place. As 
a result of Soviet legacy Kazakhstan’s legal framework for the intellectual property protection 
and the public awareness and understanding of it is relatively low and underdeveloped in 
comparison with many other countries of the same or higher level of development. Due to the 
fact that prior to its independence the economy of the country was centrally planned and all of 
the enterprises and property were state owned, and were put for the state’s free disposal without 
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asking for any consent or acquiring a license from the inventor, the Soviet government did not 
recognize any private property including the intellectual one62. 
Thus, the Soviet government had established a legal framework for the protection of state 
intellectual property, but never intended to do the same for the private intellectual property 
protection. Ironically, the procedures like registering patents, trademarks and copyrights, since 
solely exercised by the government, were mainly used to help the state in regulating the 
economy rather than that of protecting individuals’ inventions. The legal basis did not provide 
any protection for infringements involving producers of sound recordings, performers, or 
broadcasters. Even the special sanctions of the Criminal Code for copyright infringements were 
not sufficient enough to enforce the intellectual property protection in the country, as they did 
not foresee jail terms for the counterfeit goods producers or copyright violators, but merely 
imposed minor fines and/or obligatory social work. 
After the fall down of the Soviet Union the intellectual property right protection in 
Kazakhstan was at a critical condition or merely non-existent. As the country started its process 
of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, it had to face numerous new 
challenges, and the field of intellectual property rights protection did not become an exception. 
Thus, starting from 1991 Kazakhstan has made substantial changes in its intellectual property 
rights regime63. The commitment of the country’s leadership to become a full fledge WTO 
member and thereby further integrate into the global economy, has had its positive influence on 
the development of the statutory framework for bringing the country's intellectual property 
protection to nowadays international standards.  
 
                                                 
62 The Coalition For The Intellectual Property Rights, Summary of Results From the Kazakhstan Republic's "Intellect" Campaign, 
http://www.cipr.org/activities/intellect_10_03/index.htm    
63 “Announcement Of The Protection Of Industrial Property In Kazakhstan,” World Intellectual Property Organization, 
Patents And Trademarks Office, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/con/files/cons215.htm  
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TRIPs – Current Situation with Intellectual Property Rights in Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan has introduced several laws and legislative acts, along with signing and 
thereby becoming a party to major international treaties and conventions on 
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement. All of the newly adopted 
laws and regulations, international conventions, special public awareness increasing 
campaigns, and closer cooperation with the IT companies and foreign countries 
make up the legal and statutory framework for a more efficient enforcement and 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
In particular, the below-mentioned legislative acts and international treaties had been signed, 
adopted and put into force in the period of 1991–2003 (shown in the order of enactment):   
? The Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 18, 1995 No. 2364 
“About Ratification of the Eurasian Patent Convention dated September 9, 1994.” The 
abovementioned convention was established by the contracting parties to the convention – 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, and Ukraine - which had expressed their determination to strengthen inter-
governmental cooperation in intellectual property protection by ensuring that a patent issued 
in any of the Convention member countries is eligible for the same treatment in other 
member countries. The Eurasian Patent Convention was formed in accordance with the 
Article 19 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (64).  
? The Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, which came into force on June 10, 1996, is 
based on the WIPO’s model law, and guarantees protection of computer programs and sound 
recordings, provides copyright owners with exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution 
(including importation, rental and public lending), as well as protects public display and 
                                                 
64 Kazakhstan’s Legislation Database Online, http://www.pavlodar.com/zakon/index.html?dok=00544&oraz=00&noraz=0)   
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public performance, broadcasting, and the right of translation and adaptation. It provides a 
Berne-compatible term of life plus fifty years and includes effective sanctions for 
infringement. The fine for the violation of copyright or neighboring rights is set at a 
maximum of up to 50.000 times official monthly minimum wage65. 
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 13, 1999 No. 422-I “About Protection of 
New Plant Varieties and Species.” 
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 16, 1999 No. 427-1 “The Patent Law.” 
The above law is basically a domestic version of the major international conventions’ 
provisions on intellectual property rights protection as well as the TRIPs’ Article XXVII. 
Thus, the Article 6 of the Law says that patents can and shall be given for “any invention, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, given that they are new, involve 
an inventive step/effort and are capable of industrial application.66” 
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 26, 1999 No. 456 – 1, “Law on 
Trademarks, Service Marks and Appellations of Origin” Any sign, or any combination of 
graphical, alphabetic, numeric, and word order signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, is capable of constituting a 
trademark in accordance with the Kazakhstani law on trademarks (Part II, Article V of the 
Law) 67 . Such signs, in particular words including personal names, letters, numerals, 
                                                 
65 Zhunisbekova, Lyazzat, “Addressing Intellectual Property Rights Reforms in Kazakhstan,” Monterey Institute of International St
udies, April, 1999 
66 Patent Law Of The Republic Of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Institute Of Patent Expertise, 
KazPatent, http://www.kazpatent.org/english/acts/patent_law.html 
67 “Pre-hearing Brief of the International Intellectual Property Alliance in the GSP Review of the Intellectual Property 
Rights Practices of Kazakhstan,” International Intellectual Property Alliance, Washington D.C., USA, September 26, 2003, 
p.4 http://www.iipa.com/gsp/2003_Sep26_GSP_Kazakhstan.pdf 
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figurative elements and combinations of colors as well as any combination of such signs, 
shall be eligible for registration as trademarks.  
? Nevertheless, the law specifically lists specifications of a sign, which cannot be capable of 
constituting trademark, and thus, cannot be eligible for registration. For example, the 
following elements cannot be registered as trademarks: 
o allegedly false or misleading about the product or its manufacturer, including false 
geographical indication of the good’s origin; 
o since intended to designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that 
the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true place of 
origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the 
good; 
o signs which indicate/contain or consist of a geographical indication identifying 
mineral waters, wines or spirits not originating in the place indicated by the 
geographical indication, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the 
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as 
“kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like   
o signs commercial exploitation of which can have negative influence on public order 
or morality. 
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 11, 2001 No. 201-2, “About Ratification 
of the Agreement on Trademark Law Treaty68”; 
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated June 29, 2001 No. 217-2 “About Legal 
Protection of Integrated Microscheme Topology (Layout Designs Of Integrated Circuits).69” 
The law is intended to provide protection to the layout-designs (topographies) of integrated 
                                                 
68 Kazakhstan’s Intellectual Property Laws, Shabalina & Partners Law Firm, Patent Attorney, 
http://www.shabalinpatent.com/info.asp?lang=en&url=/NSC_LNK_law.htm 
69Annual Report On Intellectual Property Rights Protection, The Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO), 
http://www.eapo.org/eng/report1999/8_5_kaz.html  
 56
circuits. Article 6 “Authorship on Topology,” specifies that the exclusive rights of authorship 
for topology belong to a person (or group of persons) who had created it through his/their 
creative effort. Those people that have provided technical, organizational or financial 
assistance, but have not put in their creative/innovative effort cannot be considered as the 
exclusive right holders for the topology.  
o In accordance with the Article 7 of the Law, the following actions are considered 
unlawful if performed without the authorization of the right holder: importing, selling, 
or otherwise distributing for commercial purposes a protected layout-design, an 
integrated circuit in which a protected layout-design is incorporated, or an article 
incorporating such an integrated circuit only in so far as it continues to contain an 
unlawfully reproduced layout-design. 
o The period of topology rights exclusivity is set to be 10 years since the date of 
official registration of topology (Article 13 of the Law). In case of illegal use of the 
topology the illegal user of the topology must fully compensate the loses both for 
material and moral damage, as well as pay a fine of minimum 10.000 and maximum 
50.000 official monthly average wage (Article 14 of the Law).  
? The Declaration of the Republic of Kazakhstan “About International Agreement in the Area 
of Industrial Property Protection” dated February 5, 1993 as well as the Government 
Resolution No. 1249 dated September 26, 2001 on development and adoption of the 
“Conception of Intellectual Property Rights Protection,” both are major official 
commitments of the government to regulate and improve the domestic situation with the 
intellectual property protection.  
The Government had created and adopted the conception on intellectual property rights 
protection as another step to further and greater integration into the global economy of the 
twenty first century, which due to rapid technological and intellectual property development 
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has turned into an intellectual economy, in which IT and intellectual innovative/creative 
effort play key roles. Thus, it is proposed by the Government, that Kazakhstan as an “equal 
participant of international cultural and science-technological exchange processes, as well as 
the member of the WIPO, must guarantee fullest compliance and enforcement of the 
intellectual property rights protection of both domestic and foreign rights holders by 
international standards”70.  
Therefore, the policy of the Government in the field of intellectual property is intended to: 
o strengthen the country’s science-technological potential, through constant 
improvement and development of the intellectual property rights related legislation,  
o greater cooperation with foreign countries and international organizations dealing 
with IT and intellectual property rights,  
o increase exchange of information and experiences in dealing with intellectual 
property rights protection and enforcement with foreign  countries, 
o enforce the coordination of work of the governmental agencies entitled to protect the  
intellectual property rights,    
o create conditions for healthy competition,  
o protection of domestic markets from counterfeit products production, use and 
distribution,  
o prepare specialists in the field of intellectual property,  
o and increase public’s awareness about piracy and legal aspects of it, by raising 
information availability. 
? The Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 2, 2001 No. 
904 “About the Committee on Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Ministry 
                                                 
70 The Conception of Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Preamble, paragraph 1 
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of Economy and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan.71” The Committee on Standardization, 
Metrology, and Certification among other things, is authorized to:  
o set the general metrological requirements, 
o organize the fundamental research in the areas of standardization, metrology, and 
certification, 
o set the procedures and standards of standardization, certification and metrology, 
as well as work on further bringing of the standards in compliance with the 
international ones,  
o in the framework of its competency issues licenses to physical and juridical 
entities, and keeps record of issued licenses, 
o participates in international science-technological cooperation in the fields of 
standardization, metrology, and certification intended to remove the technical 
barriers to trade, 
o coordinates the process of formation and implementation of the National 
Standards Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, intergovernmental, regional, 
international  and national standards of other countries,  
o publish and distribute the national standards of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
intergovernmental standards, as well as rules and recommendations of the 
international organizations on standardization, metrology, and certification, 
o send to the international organizations dealing with the standardization, 
metrology and certification issues their comments remarks on  those legislative 
acts, both national and international, which by Kazakhstan’s judgment might 
result in establishment of technical barriers to trade.  
                                                 
71 Annual Special Section 301 Report On Global Intellectual Property Rights Protection Office Of The US 
Trade Representative, Washington D.C., USA, http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/usinfo/ustr/2002/02-
48.htm 
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? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated November 16, 2001 No. 259-2 “About 
Joining of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Budapest Treaty on the International 
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure72”;  
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated November 16, 2001 No. 258-2 “About 
Joining of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Nice Agreement Concerning the International 
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks”; 
? The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated November 16, 2001 No. 257-2 “About Joining 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International 
Patent Classification73”; 
      
  In addition, the Republic of Kazakhstan is a contracting party to the following international 
conventions and agreements on the protection of intellectual property rights (Treaties 
Administered by WIPO): 
• Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (joined December 25, 
1991); 
• Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (joined December 25, 1991); 
• Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (joined April 12, 1999); 
• Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (joined December 25, 
1991); 
                                                 
72 Kazakhstan’s Membership In International Organizations, Appendix B – Membership In The World Community Of Nations, 
Kazakhstan Business Development Committee, http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/99kazapb.htm 
73 Bolotov, Yury, and Wilson, Michael A. Michael Wilson & Partners, Lawyers and Business Consultants, Practical 
Measures For The Protection OF Means Of Production Differentiation In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, And Uzbekistan, 
http://www.mwp.kz/art_pmftp.html 
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• Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the 
Purposes of the Registration of Marks (joined April 24, 2002); 
• Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs 
(November 7, 2002); 
• Patent Cooperation Treaty (joined December 25, 1991); 
• Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification (joined January 24, 
2003); 
• Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms (joined August 3, 2001); 
• Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure (joined April 24, 2002); 
• Trademark Law Treaty (joined November 7, 2002). 
 
Membership in other bodies/treaties: EAPO, UCC. 
• Member of EAPO since September 1994. 
• Member of UCC since August 1992. 
 
 Nevertheless, according to the latest statistics nearly 40 percent of the Kazakhstan’s 
population do not clearly understand what is meant by the “intellectual property” and cannot 
specify the ways to protect it. 
 On a contrary though, estimated gains from reduction of counterfeit IT products market share 
in a majority of the countries results in greater and faster development of a country’s domestic 
IT industry. Thus, for example, the reduction of “pirate” IT products manufacturing and use by 
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10 percent, would result in 49 percent growth of the global IT market, a 15 percent increase of a 
projected 34 percent for the years of 2001 – 2006  
(74).  
 According to the information provided by the Microsoft Company’s branch in the CIS, 
Kazakhstan and Central Asia, for the fiscal year 2003 75: 
• Microsoft’s total sales in 2003 reached $US 32.19billion, which is 13% higher than in 2002 
(US$ 28.37 billion); 
• Total sales in the CIS countries grew by 55% in comparison with the year 2003; 
• Microsoft’s clientele in Kazakhstan doubled over one year since it opened its office there; 6 
out of 8 Central Asian Certified Microsoft Partners are located in Kazakhstan; 
• During 2003 sales of Windows Server in Kazakhstan grew by 50 percent, sales of Windows 
XP Home grew by 425 percent; 
• Kazakhstan accounts for 88 percent of all Microsoft Company’s Central Asian sales, while 
Kyrgyz Republic - 2 percent, Turkmenistan – 4 percent, Uzbekistan – 6 percent, and 
Tajikistan for “0” (zero) percent, since not a single copy of any  licensed Microsoft product 
had been sold there. 
 
Yet, despite the overall improvement of the situation with intellectual property protection and 
drop in counterfeit products manufacturing and distribution, the Microsoft Company claims that 
88 percent of all Windows software products in the Central Asian countries are not licensed i.e. 
pirate/counterfeit copies. As a result, according to the director of Microsoft Company’s branch in 
                                                 
74 Ibraev, Kuat, IT Companies Signed the Declaration On Intellectual Property Rights  Protection, Panorama, #43, November 4, 
2003,  http://www.panorama.kz/info/index.asp?yearfolder=2003&num=43&NumArticle=22 
 
75Ibraev, Kuat, In 2003 the Sales of Microsoft in Central Asia Grew by 137.5 Percent, Panorama, #38, October 3, 2003,   
http://www.panorama.kz/info/index.asp?yearfolder=2003&num=38&NumArticle=48 
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Kazakhstan Mr. Aidar Dauletov, the company is losing millions of dollars in sales every year 
(76).   
 As was stated in the conference on “Intellectual Property Protection in Kazakhstan. The 
Current Situation and Future Prospects,” which was held in Astana on November 4, 2003, the 
overall share of pirate/counterfeit intellectual property products in Kazakhstan is over 80 percent. 
77 According to the IT experts, the IT market in Kazakhstan is just starting to develop, thus, it is 
important for the country to establish a solid and efficient intellectual property rights protection 
and enforcement system. The IT companies, which are now working in Kazakhstan have also 
signed a Declaration On Intellectual Property Rights Protection, which will ensure that the 
signatories fully comply with the rights of the intellectual property users, the domestic and 
international laws on intellectual property use and protection, as well as promised not to produce, 
distribute or use counterfeit products, and act in the framework of the licensing agreements.      
 In addition to the conference organized by the Kazakhstani IT companies, in the period 
between 6 and 23 of October of this year, a major intellectual property rights protection 
promotion campaign took place across Kazakhstan. The campaign called “Intellect”, according 
to the Minister of Justice Mr. Onalsin Zhymabekov, “is the starting point for a fight against 
piracy and counterfeiting.” In his opening speech Mr. Zhymabekov stated that “intellectual 
property is the engine of progress and civilization, it is also technical and technological base for 
modern industrial and economic development,” and that Kazakhstan still has a lot of problems in 
this field such as “counterfeiting, piracy, plagiarism”  
 The speakers have mentioned that due to weak intellectual property rights enforcement 
Kazakhstan has been placed on the US’s Watch List in accordance with the Section 301, and 
thus, could face economic measures against its exports. Underdevelopment of Kazakhstan’s 
                                                 
76 Ibraev, Kuat, In 2003 the Sales of Microsoft in Central Asia Grew by 137.5 Percent, Panorama, #38, October 3, 2003,   
http://www.panorama.kz/info/index.asp?yearfolder=2003&num=38&NumArticle=48 
77 92 percent of all software program market in China is illegal i.e. consists of counterfeit/”pirate” copies. 
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intellectual property rights enforcement and protection fields was also named as one of the major 
causes for the slow down in Kazakhstan’s WTO accession negotiations (78).  
 Nevertheless, the Government of the country has shown its interest and concern with the 
improvement of the intellectual property rights protection and as a result, the issues dealing with 
the intellectual property were included in the Kazakhstan’s “Industrial-Innovative Development 
Strategy until 2015.” 
 However, according to the data presented at the meeting, the information available on 
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement is not sufficient for increasing public’s 
alert on issues of piracy and plagiarism. Thus, the survey showed that 55 percent of the 
respondents had encountered situations where illegal intellectual property had been either sold or 
used. Despite such fact, only 12 percent of those respondents ever contacted the government 
officials or reported about the illegal manufacturing, distribution and use of intellectual property 
products (79).  
 As a result of this campaign the Memorandum on Cooperation on the Issues of Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection has been signed by the Government officials, in particular the Vice 
Ministers of Justice and of Interior Affairs, the Chairmen of the Customs Committee and the 
Financial Police, and the intellectual property rights organizations such as Kazakhstan’s 
Businessmen Forum, Kazakhstan’s Association of Intellectual Property and Neighboring Rights. 
Several international organizations dealing with intellectual property protection such as the 
Coalition for Intellectual Property Protection, the Microsoft Company, International 
Organization of Phonogram Recordings, the Association of Copyright Holders also participated 
in the meeting. 
                                                 
78 The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Website, News, October 24, 2003  
http://www.government.kz/pls/portal30/PORTAL30.wwv_media.show?p_id=27350&p_currcornerid=25282&p_settingssetid=1372&
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 The main objective of the Memorandum was to establish a Working Group, which would 
coordinate the work on improving and amending Kazakhstani intellectual property legislation. 
The suggestion to form Guild of Audio-Video Property Sellers was presented by the Business 
Association of the Southern Kazakhstan (80).   
 Finally, in the framework of the “Astana KITEL - 2003” fair, 25 domestic and 6 large 
foreign IT companies currently operating in Kazakhstan have agreed to work together and form 
first IT Association in Kazakhstan. The IT companies and the Government agreed that the main 
purpose of the Kazakhstani IT Association will be to serve as a watchdog for monopolistic 
activities and unfair competition in the IT market, to encourage emergence of new IT companies, 
to help create civilized and healthy market relations in the country, as well as to provide 
assistance and support to the companies involved in training of qualified, skilled IT 
professionals.  
 
 What needs to be done? 
 Despite the fact that the situation with the intellectual property rights protection is notably 
improving in Kazakhstan, the speed and actual quality of the implementation and enforcement 
procedures are not sufficient for the country’s smooth accession into the WTO. Thereby, in 
order for Kazakhstan to faster accede into WTO, at least the following measures must be taken: 
 The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by 
Satellite 
 Due to the importance and growing volume of the satellite television and other satellite 
transmition, the global community has realized the necessity to create and enact a special 
international agreement, which could effectively regulate the transmitting and distribution of the 
                                                 
80 The Ministry of Justice Website, Press Release, www.minjust.kz, October 30, 2003  
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program-carrying signals done through the use of satellite. As a consequence, as early as May 
1974, the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted 
by Satellite or more widely recognizable as Satellites Convention (Brussels, 1974) was 
established.  
 In accordance with the Article 9 of the above Convention, it was deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and remained open for the signature by any State that 
was a member of the United Nations, any of the Specialized Agencies brought into relationship 
with the United Nations, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, or was a party to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, until March 31, 1975. As a member of the United 
Nations the Soviet Union had joined the Convention. However, after the brake up of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian Federation was the only among the CIS countries to continue its membership 
at the Convention, as from December 25, 1991 (81).   
 Kazakhstan’s domestic legal system does not provide any protection to the satellite program 
transmitters as well as does not envision any punishment for its illegal retransmition. Thus, it is 
advisable for Kazakhstan to become a signatory to the Convention on satellite signal 
transmitting, because it will create a legal framework for the regulation and protection of the 
program-carrying transmitted by satellite, and settle problems Kazakhstan faces due to illegal 
retransmittions of many foreign, especially Russian programs, by its domestic television and 
radio companies. Moreover, it will ensure that its own programs, recordings, etc. transmitted via 
satellite will not be illegally retransmitted by other countries since each of the contracting party 
to the Convention “undertakes to take adequate measures to prevent the distribution on or from 
its territory of any program-carrying signal by any distributor for whom the signal emitted to or 
passing through the satellite is not intended”. 
                                                 
81 The WIPO Website, The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, The 
List of the Contracting Parties http://www.wipo.org/treaties/documents/english/word/p-vie&sa.doc 
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 International Convention For the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations – Rome Convention 
 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations - Rome Convention (1961) was established in order to provide 
protection of performers, producers and broadcasters of the phonograms by the means of 
granting “national treatment,” which is accorded by the domestic law of the Contracting State in 
which protection is claimed: 
“(a) to performers who are its nationals, as regards performances taking place, broadcast, or first 
fixed, on its territory; 
(b) to producers of phonograms who are its nationals, as regards phonograms first fixed or first 
published on its territory; 
(c) to broadcasting organizations which have their headquarters on its territory, as regards 
broadcasts transmitted from transmitters situated on its territory.” 
 Furthermore, the Convention grants performers protection from illegal, without their consent, 
broadcasting and communication to the public of their performance, except where the 
performance used in the broadcasting or the public communication is itself already a broadcast 
performance or is made from a fixation. It also prohibits the fixation and reproduction of a 
fixation of the performer’s performance without his/her consent.  
 The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs 
 Kazakhstan has to join the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of 
Industrial Designs, which insures that any “national” of any of the member states to the 
Agreement has the possibility of obtaining protection for his/her industrial design in all of the 
contracting states to the Agreement through a single deposit made with the International Bureau 
of WIPO. According to the Agreement the term “national” does not only cover natural or legal 
person having the nationality of one of the contracting States, but also extends to any natural or 
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legal person who “whilst not having the nationality of such State, has his domicile (or 
headquarters) or a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment on the territory of 
such State” (82). 
 
 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International 
Registration 
 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International 
Registration, specifically protects the “appellation of origin" or in other words,  geographical 
name of a country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating there, the 
quality and characteristics of which result entirely or essentially due to the geographical 
environment, including natural and human factors. Thus, for example, an “appellation origin” 
that has been granted protection in one of the countries of the Special Union (the countries-
parties to the Agreement comprise the Special Union in the framework of the Agreement) cannot 
be deemed to have become generic in another country, for as long as it is protected as an 
“appellation of origin” in the country of origin. The Agreement’s protective coverage spreads 
not only on the name of the country, region, or locality whose name constitutes the appellation 
of origin but also includes protection against any “usurpation” or imitation, even if the true 
origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in translated form or accompanied 
by terms such as "kind," "type," "make," "imitation," or the “like” (83).  
 
 The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 13, 1999 No. 422-I “About Protection of 
New Plant Varieties and Species.” According to the Law the rights of plant breeders are 
protectable by patents. Thus, the Article 3 of the Law provides protection of the rights of the 
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83 Article 3 “Content of Protection” of the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International 
Registration   
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breeders of new plant genera and species (i.e. plants, animal, trees, and grapes varieties), which 
have the characteristics of novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability. The period of patent 
validity is as follows: for plants it is 25 years, animal kind – 30 years, type of grapes, trees – 35 
year. The patent can be prolonged but for no more than 10 years. 
 Nevertheless, the Law does not have any regulatory tool in case if any “anticompetitive 
practices” take place. As a result, there is no right of a distinct higher authority for “compulsory 
licensing,” like the one envisaged in TRIPs, in case if exclusive rights holder – the patent holder 
does not agree to make his/her invention available for the public’s use through the means of 
granting voluntary licenses on reasonable terms and conditions within a reasonable period of 
time.  
 Hence, Kazakhstan needs to amend its national legislative act on plant genera and species 
protection by incorporating a special article/clause on “Compulsory Licensing,” in order to bring 
it in conformity with the rules and requirements of WTO’s TRIPs Agreement. Moreover, since 
the Article 29 “International Agreements” of the abovementioned Law states that “in case if 
those international agreements, signed and ratified by the Republic of Kazakhstan, foresee rules 
and conditions different from those foreseen by the Law, than they should be applied” (84). For 
this reason, Kazakhstan could become a signatory to the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants, which exercises similar rules and regulations as the ones 
put into effect by the TRIPs agreement, i.e. foreseeing the non-discrimination principle through 
the application of the national treatment and most-favored nation treatment (85).        
 WIPO Copyright Treaty – Geneva 1996    
                                                 
84 The superiority of the rules and regulations foreseen in the international agreements, signed and ratified by the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, over the national legislation is granted in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
which has the power of Law, dated December 12, 1995 No. 2679 “On Signing, Implementation, and Denunciation Of International 
Agreements.”  
85 International Union For the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) Convention of 1961, revised at Geneva (1972, 1978 and 1991) 
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 While Kazakhstani Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights provides copyright protection 
of literary and artistic work, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, if signed and ratified by Kazakhstan 
will cover a greater scope of literary and artistic work, because the meaning of “artistic and 
literary works” had been revised and added with new types of works, which were not protected 
before. In addition, as a Contracting party to the treaty, Kazakhstan will be a party to the Union 
established by the Treaty, and will enjoy the national and most-favored nation treatments. In 
other words, Kazakhstani authors will enjoy the same treatment and protection of their work 
protected under the treaty in countries of the Union other than the country of origin.   
 Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the Figurative Elements of 
Marks - Vienna Agreement (1973), amended in 1985; 
 Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the Figurative Elements of 
Marks - Vienna Agreement (1973), amended in 1985, provides a common classification for the 
figurative elements of marks for the countries which are party to the Agreement and thereby to a 
Special Union. The Classification of Figurative Elements comprises a list of categories, 
divisions and sections in which the figurative elements of marks are classified together with 
explanatory notes. The Article 5 of the Agreement on “Committee of Experts,” establishes a 
special Committee from the member country representatives, which have the right to make 
amendments and additions to the Classification, address recommendations to the countries of the 
Special Union for the purpose of facilitating the use of the Classification, take all the other 
measures which, without entailing financial implications for the budget of the Special Union or 
for the Organization, contribute towards facilitating the application of the Classification of 
Figurative Elements by developing countries and have the right to establish subcommittees and 
working groups.  
 If Kazakhstan joins the Agreement than it will be required to take all possible measures to 
ensure that it follows and uses the Classification of Figurative Elements listed by the Agreement 
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when registering marks in its territory. As a party of the Special Union Kazakhstan will also 
have the right of proposal for amendments or additions to the Classification of Figurative 
Elements. Such propositions in Accordance with the Article 5 (5) may be made by “the 
competent Office of any country of the Special Union, the International Bureau, any 
intergovernmental organization represented in the Committee of Experts pursuant to 
paragraph (2)(b) and any country or organization specially invited by the Committee of Experts 
to submit such proposals.”   
 Finally, according to the Articles 65 and 66 of the TRIPs, Kazakhstan as a developing 
country may enjoy some extensions on the implementation period. For example, as stated by 
Para. 4 of Article 65 “Transitional Provisions,” 
• “(4) To the extent that a developing country Member is obliged by this Agreement to 
extend product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable in its territory 
on the general date of application of this Agreement for that Member, as defined in 
paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provisions on product patents of 
Section 5 of Part II to such areas of technology for an additional period of five years.” 
 Additionally, the Article 9.1 of the TRIPs Agreement requires WTO member countries to 
comply with the Appendix of the Berne Convention (1971) which contains special provisions for 
developing countries. The special provisions give developing countries, inter alia, with some 
flexibility in the area of compulsory licenses for translations and reproductions subject to a 
number of notification procedures. Such flexibility might make the use of translations and 
reproductions in developing countries like Kazakhstan more affordable for educational needs, as 
a result of providing a possibility for acquiring licenses on more reasonable conditions.   
        CONCLUSION 
 In general, Kazakhstan has done a sizeable amount of work both in implementing the 
international intellectual property standards and increasing importance of intellectual property 
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protection in the public. Yet, in order for Kazakhstan to become WTO member and to more 
importantly be able to fulfill its ambitious goals in innovative-industrial development the 
country still has a long way to go. According to the WIPO suggestion for developing countries it 
is necessary for the intellectual property rights protection system-building nation to ensure that 
their new domestic legal texts fully correspond to the provisions of the relevant international 
conventions as well as the TRIPs Agreement. Nevertheless, effective enforcement does not 
come easy, especially enforcement of the protection of intellectual property rights, which for so 
long had been unprotected and violated without a bit of regret or even real assessment of the 
violation act itself. In Kazakhstan, the country with the Soviet-communal property past, it would 
be very difficult to change the public’s mind about the use and protection of the intellectual 
property. Despite the fact, that a whole new population has grown since Kazakhstan’s 1991 
independence, it still is very much affected by the notion of communal property and its use 
without asking for special consent. Ironically, it is not an unusual thing for the intellectual 
property producers such as music performers to violate the existent laws on protection of the 
copyright material. Despite the fact that there are no officially published statistics on such 
actions, it is generally perceived among the public, that some music performers, in attempt to 
evade the applicable sales tax, produce counterfeit, or unregistered copies of their compact disks 
or tapes, and thereby contribute to the illegal intellectual property market expansion. In addition, 
the Kazakhstani television and radio chanells used to transmit Hollywood and Indian programs, 
and Russian movies and songs, without ever paying for copyright. It is true that with the 
introduction of legal framework for copyright protection, and increased intellectual property 
rights protection issue awareness, the number of such illegal transmissions have significantly 
decreased. Yet, it also true that if in large cities the enforcement agencies do efficient job in 
enforcing and monitoring intellectual property rights protection and use, in smaller, mainly rural 
areas such monitoring is not done on a sufficient level, as a result of lack of financial and 
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technical resources. therefore, it is clear that for the country to successfully adopt and enforce 
intellectual property protection laws and regulations, an effective institution building in the legal 
system should be addressed first. On top of that, to continue the process of systemic 
transformation, it is crucial that Kazakhstan’s Government works on increasing public 
awareness and responsibility regarding intellectual property rights protection. 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS) 
In 2001, services constituted about sixty percent of the world's output according to WTO 
statistics, and international trade in services continues to grow rapidly. Trade in services has 
increased particularly in developing countries, accounting for more than fifty percent of total export 
revenues for some nations. In recognition of the growing importance of services in the world 
economy, trade ministers negotiated the GATS as the first attempt to draw international trade in 
services into a multilateral framework of rules and market access guidelines. 
Services have been the fastest growing component of cross-border trade and investment 
activity for the better part of the last decade and a half. Estimates show that total measurable trade in 
services, as defined by the various types of transactions subject to multilateral disciplines under the 
GATS, stood at some $2,3 trillion at the end of 2000. This represents 7.6 percent of world output 
and over a third of total trade in goods and services (WTO, 2001). 
Yet, not so long ago it was basically unimaginable to comprehend services as tradable. In 
general, services were considered as domestic matters and were defined as being produced where 
they were consumed. Moreover, the cross-border transfer of services was considered to be an 
international movement of a factor of production and not trade. This was largely due to the fact that 
cross-border flows of services are basically invisible. Nevertheless, rapid advancement in the 
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computer technology and growing share of the so-called “e-trade,” made services appear in a 
completely new way, by making them even more mobile and internationally transferable.  
As a result of such developments the international community started to address the issue of trade in 
services. The outcome of such address was the multilateral negotiations on trade in services and the 
establishment of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), its associated annexes and 
national schedules of commitments, which still are considered to be one of the most innovative and 
important accomplishments of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
 The GATS generally covers all aspects of international trade, except those supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority and services directly related to the exercise of such rights. A 
framework agreement features the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, through the 
provisions of national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment, transparency in domestic 
regulation, and fair application of laws. 
The GATS provides for the negotiation of commitments at three levels: the framework 
which lays out the general obligations for services trade, in much the same way as the GATT does 
for trade in goods; a number of annexes on specific sectors as well as the schedules of commitments 
submitted by WTO Members. Due to its structure and its voluntary, “bottom-up”, approach to 
liberalization, the GATS allows WTO Members to select the sectors, modes of supply (i.e. cross-
border trade; movement of consumers; commercial presence and movement of suppliers) and 
regulatory conditions in which liberalization commitments are made. Important thing is that the 
GATS also foresees an opportunity for the member country to make no commitments by leaving 
entire sectors out of their schedules. Such flexibility, and the emphasis in GATS on the progressive, 
voluntary nature of liberalization, helps explaining why the GATS is arguably the most 
“development-friendly” of all Uruguay Round Agreements. 
  
IMPLEMENTING GATS FOR KAZAKHSTAN’S FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN SERVICES  
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ELECTRICITY SECTOR OVERVIEW  
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union the newly independent states, including 
Kazakhstan had to undergo a painful and challenging transformation in order to integrate into the 
market economy driven world. The transformation took place in all of the sectors of economy as 
well as the everyday life.  
Kazakhstan was one of the first among former USSR countries to reform its power sector in 
1996. The electricity sector, historically state owned and run, had to face major reforms as the 
country pursued a policy of liberalization, allowing privatization of the national electricity grid 
companies not only by domestic but also by foreign investors. In 1996, the Government of 
Kazakhstan embarked on a bold program of reforms aimed at introducing private participation in the 
power sector and establishing a competitive power market. By 1997, the electricity generation plants 
were separated from the former Kazakhstanenergo and privatized, the high voltage transmission 
network operated by Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC), a joint stock 
company with 100 percent state ownership, which owns and operates over 23,000 km of high-
voltage transmission lines as well as 73 substations, a National Dispatch Center (NDC) and nine 
Regional Dispatch Centers (RDCs), was formed on July 14, 199786. The regional distribution 
companies were established and took over the functions of regional electricity supply. In addition, 
three regional electricity distribution companies were privatized. In the area of power sector reforms, 
Kazakhstan ranks among the most advanced countries of the former Soviet Union. 
Implementation of such changes faced powerful resistance among the public, which was 
used to services produced and provided under the state monopolies. Hence, opening of service 
sectors to international competition, particularly through direct investment by foreign suppliers 
                                                 
86 Kadrzhanova, Azhar, “Kazakhstan’s Power Sector As Of End 2001”, Kazakhstan: Power Industry Information From BISNIS, May 
24, 2002 http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/isa/020524pwrgen.htm 
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(commercial presence) can be a good proof of the government’s commitment to the sector’s 
restructuring and demonopolization. As a result of reforms in the electricity sector the price on 
electric power in Kazakhstan is lower than in other CIS countries. The tariff rates, previously 
completely unrealistic, as a result of the central planning system under which the tariff rates did not 
reflect the cost of production and transmission, were recalculated and set at a comparable market 
levels.  
The electricity distribution system consists of three levels of transmission networks, power 
generating companies, wholesalers, and end-users of electric energy. Kazakhstan has 54 fossil fuel 
powered plants, with a total installed capacity of 18,240 MW (megawatt), five hydroelectric power 
stations, and a nuclear plant at Aktau87.  
Presently, power industry structure has three main segments: 
? Large power plants of national level which provide considerable generation volumes 
of electric power – Ekibastuz GRES-1 and GRES-2, Aksu GRES, Karaganda 
GRES-2, and Irtysh GES cascade, Bukhtarma GES, Ust-Kamenagorsk GES, and 
Shulba GES; 
? National power grid which provides services on transmission and dispatching of 
electric power and regulation of capacity, as well as agreed international electric 
flows with power systems of neighboring CIS countries; 
? Regional energy companies that generate and distribute electric and heat energy: 
power plants of regional level, distribution electric network companies (REC) and 
heat supply systems for cities and villages. 
Transmission networks are divided into interregional, regional and local networks.  Interregional 
networks include high voltage lines (1150, 500 and 220 kW) transmitting energy from producers to 
                                                 
87 Kazakhstan’s Power Generation Industry, Gateway To Kazakhstan, http://www.kazakhstan-
gateway.kz/investments/powergeneration.htm 
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the largest regional networks and users.  Regional level networks include 220 kW lines transmitting 
energy from interregional substations to smaller end-users and redistribution (wholesaler) 
enterprises. Local networks have lines supplying energy to individual end-users and households. 
Kazakhstan's industrialized north produces about 80 percent and consumes about 70 percent 
of the country's electricity. After seven consecutive years of declining electricity production, in 2000 
Kazakhstan generated 48.7 billion kWh of power, an 8 percent increase over 1999. In 2001, 
domestic production was up 7.3% to 55.2 billion kWh and consumption was up 4.2% to 56.7 billion 
kWh88.  
There are 22 regional distribution companies in Kazakhstan, of which four have been 
privatized. The first two electricity distribution networks to be run privately were Almatyenergo (by 
Almaty Power Consolidated, a Belgian company, since sold back to the Kazakh government), and 
Karagandaenergo (by National Power of the U.K and the Israeli company Ormat). In July 1999, the 
US’ company - AES was awarded management rights for the Ust-Kamenogorsk and Semipalatinsk 
distribution companies that are close to three power plants that AES operates89.  
Other regional utilities are Altaienergo in the far east, Astana REC (formerly Tselinenergo) 
serving the new capital region, Kustenayenergo, and Pavlovarenergoservice (formerly 
Pavlodarenergo) which serves the industrial heartland of the country including a large aluminum 
plant90.  
In March 2001, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced 
its intention to provide 761,000 euros (US$815,000) to Kazakhstan for the implementation of a 
                                                 
88 Kazakhstan’s Electricity Sector, Economic Cooperation Organization  
http://www.ecosecretariat.org/Countries/Kazakhstan/tab_text_report.htm 
89Facts From Kazakhstan’s Electricity Industry, The Caspian World,  
http://caspianworld.com/en/go/1915085189/935301147/342827978/#3 
90 Country Commercial Guide Kazakhstan, September 2003, from Business Information Service For Newly Independent States, 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/0307KZCCGFY04.htm 
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program to privatize the remaining regional power distributing companies. In line with the plan, the 
privatization process started in February 2001 and is on its way now91. 
Kazakhstan also has plans to privatize the electricity distribution system, but the process has 
moved slowly, and only a few networks are now under private management. KEGOC, which has the 
responsibility to manage the overall grid network, does so with the East Kazakhstan Region Electric 
Company, a division of AES, which handles the power grid in Eastern Kazakhstan under a 15-year 
agreement with the Kazakhstani government signed in November 2000.  
KEGOC owns the country’s transmission lines and substations and together with Kazakhstan 
Electricity Energy and Power Market Operator (KOREM), formed in July 2000, serves as operator 
of the electricity wholesale market of the Kazakhstani Single Power Grid (SPG), a system under 
centralized dispatch management from Almaty city through nine regional dispatch centers and 18 
district-level dispatch centers 92 . KEGOC is also involved in Government’s power sector 
development strategies, formulation of technical policies, and long-term planning. 
In accordance with the Government’s restructuring program, Kazakhstan with the financial 
assistance of the World Bank and the EBRD has started the Electricity Grid Rehabilitation Project. 
The project's total financing requirements, including interest during construction and other loan 
charges, are estimated at US$257 million, of which US$140 million is provided by the World Bank, 
and US$45 million by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The remaining part 
is financed by KEGOC and is equal to about US$72 million 93 . The project should be fully 
implemented by 2005.  Major areas of the project include modernization of substations, upgrade of 
relay protection at most KEGOC substations, modernization of dispatch control, including purchase 
and installation of SCADA/EMS system, a digital corporate telecommunications network, 
                                                 
91 The Investment Development Program of KEGOK for 2003-2006 
92 Country Commercial Guide Kazakhstan, September 2003, from Business Information Service For Newly Independent States, 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/0307KZCCGFY04.htm 
93 Wallis, Richard, “Kazakhstan Power Sector Modernized With EBRD Finance -  
Cleaner Air Is An Additional Benefit,” EBRD Press Release, December 3, 1999http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/1999/67dec3.htm  
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commercial record keeping system, and a trading system, organizational development of KEGOC 
including development, shipment, and installation of a Management Information System; and 
technical assistance including designation of the main project consultant and technical consultants 
for each project component94.   
Construction of the Shulbinskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant, and building a cinder storage 
facility and installing new equipment at Ust-Kamenogorsk Thermal Electric Power Plant are also 
sector rehabilitation projects undertaken not by the government but by AES, a private company, 
owner of the largest electricity production plants. In order to successfully carry out the projects AES 
is receiving a US$30 million EBRD credit.  
There are also plans to build additional thermal-electric power plants, including five new 
combined heat and power (CHP) cogeneration facilities: 
• Uralskaya TETS -- 150 MW 
• Atayubinskaya TETS -- 450 MW  
• Mainakskaya GES -- 300 MW 
• Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya TETS -- 1,280 MW  
• Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya TETS-1 -- 500 MW95  
Kazakhstan's power generation sector is projected to boost total capacity to 86 billion kWh 
by 2015.  Projected power consumption at that time is expected to reach 81 billion kWh. 
Kazakhstan's economic development plan for 2004-2006 specifies the upgrade of power facilities, 
the launch of a North-South power transmission line and the construction of small hydropower 
                                                 
94 World Bank, “Kazakhstan Electricity Transmission Rehabilitation Project,” Report No. PID7451, July 1999, last update August 15, 
2003. 
95 Interview of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan Mr. Vladimir Shkolnik, Energy Fair 
KIOGE -2003, Astana, Kazakhstan. 
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plants.  In 2002 Kazakhstan's power generation output totaled 58.47 billion kWh, up from 55.33 
billion kWh in 200196. 
In accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On natural monopolies” 
approved in 1998, transmission and distribution of electric power and (since 2003) technical 
dispatching, generation, transmission and distribution of heat energy are under state regulation.  
However, power plants after reforms, mainly, passed to the private ownership and their 
activities are carried out under the conditions of competitive market. Electric power market and 
respectively tariff policy were improved. Methods of tariff formation on natural monopoly entities’ 
services were approved. Thus, fundamental amendments to the tariff calculation methodology for 
KEGOC and other power distributing companies’ services were introduced in the year 2000, when 
the power dispatching service was segregated and dependence on distance of electric power 
transmission up to 600 km was reduced97. Costs to cover power loss in networks of interregional 
level were included in the electric power transmission tariff in 2001.  
It should be noted that Russia and neighboring countries of Central Asia do not have such 
terms for tariffs on electric power transmission through networks of interregional and regional levels. 
Due to the implemented reforms, today, power prices for large industry consumers are one of the 
lowest in the CIS countries98. 
 
WEAK POINTS AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 
Nevertheless, despite the reforms and restructuring executed by the Government, and the fact 
that Kazakhstan technically generates enough electricity to meet its demand, even today Kazakhstan 
ought to import electricity from its neighbors. Such peculiar situation results from the fact that 
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Kazakhstan’s electricity distribution system was not build properly, i.e. the main power generation 
plants were clustered in the north near the industrial base of the country, while the southern part 
remained energy depended. Furthermore, today much of Kazakhstan's power generating equipment 
is old, bungling, and absent of modern pollution controls. The operation capacity of the plants is less 
today than what it used to be because of poor maintenance. The production of electricity is affected 
by the inferior condition of power plants due to inadequate management, lack of spare parts and 
generally obsolete equipment, most of which are more than 20 years old.  
Thus, according to the Statistics Agency’s data, metallurgy sector remains as the only 
externally competitive processing industry sector99. While other processing industry companies are 
being supported through direct and indirect subsidies provided in the form of “low and economically 
unjustified electricity, fuel and lubricants, transportation tariffs, and protectionist customs duties.” 
Furthermore, the electricity consumption per US$1 of the GDP is about 7 to 10 times higher, while 
the labor productivity is about 7 to 10 times lower in Kazakhstan than in some industrialized 
countries100. Fixed assets of Kazakhstani enterprises are significantly depreciated. For instance, in 
2001 depreciation of fixed assets averaged to 29.7 percent, sometimes reaching over 50 percent101. 
Current procedure for accumulation of financial resources for renewal of fixed assets from received 
profits does not encourage the owners to replace or upgrade outmoded equipment and thereby serves 
as an obstacle for its development. 
Inability of competing on price is one of the major obstacles that hinder Kazakhstan’s 
processing industry today. However, it is directly related to the inefficiencies in the electricity 
production and transmission sector, which leads to increased production costs, thereby, making 
Kazakhstani products more expensive than its foreign analogs. For instance, according to the 
statistics, the index of the production cost per one Tenge of sales, measured by the ratio of the 
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production cost of sold products, services, and works, to proceeds from their sales, is among the 
highest in the electricity production and distribution. The index is equal to 0.86, making the 
electricity generation and distribution sector, having deducted taxes, transportation costs and other 
expenditures, one of the least profitable102. 
Tariffs for KEGOC services are regulated by the Agency for Regulation of Natural 
Monopolies of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, there are not enough considerable 
amendments concerning regional electric network companies introduced to the tariff formation 
methodology. As a result, there are still cases of subsidies in order to provide low tariffs for the 
population and industries. Due to the shortage of financial resources, the needed repair and 
restoration works, and renovation of assets had not been made over years in many regional 
electricity distribution companies. An average percentage of assets deterioration has reached 50 
percent and more. Wire and electricity thefts cause problems103. 
On top of all, Kazakhstan incurs large energy losses during transmission and distribution 
over its 285,000 miles of distribution lines. According to Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources Mr. Vladimir Shkolnik “an average of 15 percent of the electricity generated in 
Kazakhstan is lost before it reaches consumers,” owing to the widespread deterioration of 
Kazakhstan's power infrastructure104. 
 
ASSESMENT 
Thereby it is evident that despite considerable changes and restructurings undertaken by the 
Kazakhstani government in the country’s electricity sector, there are still numerous unresolved and 
unaddressed issues which handicap further development and restructuring of the electricity sector, 
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and the economy in general. It is clear that further liberalization and more competition, which will 
push companies in the electricity sector to replace obsolete equipment, upgrade their facilities, and 
increase efficiency in order to be compatible, need to be introduced. The sector requires large 
investments in order to improve the reliability and quality of electricity supply. Yet, non-payment of 
electricity bills, an inadequate collection system, and the lack of market-based transportation tariffs 
hinder large-scale investment opportunities into Kazakhstan's transmission and distribution sector.  
 For this reason, while joining the WTO, Kazakhstan would have to be very careful on 
properly assessing the situation and taking all possible advantages out of it. For instance, WTO 
membership would inevitably require greater liberalization of a new-member country’s economy in 
general, and due to bilateral negotiations and development level in some sector in particular. Taking 
into account that at present time Kazakhstan is trading with 137 from the total of 146 WTO 
members, and the average weighted tariff rate in Kazakhstan is approximately 8.6 percent, which is 
almost equal to the average WTO rate of 6-7 percent, while items eligible for “0” (zero) to 15 
percent tariff rate account for 95 percent of all commodity items, there are no really serious grounds 
for concerns about weakening of the internal market in general105. 
 Yet, because of the underdevelopment and significant, over 50 percent, asset deterioration of 
the electricity production and distribution industry, which leads to low compatibility and efficiency, 
Kazakhstan should be more cautious liberalizing its power industry. The main reason for 
cautiousness results from the fact that rapid opening of the power industry, such as complete 
privatization of it, will lead to acute price increase both for the producer and the consumer. The 
privatized power companies, as any market force driven enterprises, in their pursuit for quickest 
investment returns would sharply drive electricity prices up, which in return will inevitably hurt not 
only an individual consumer, but the industrial consumer as well. As a result fast escalation in 
electricity prices will increase the production cost in all of the spheres of Kazakhstan’s industry, 
                                                 
105 The Innovative Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2003-2015, p.24 
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being especially harsh on the processing industry, which is Kazakhstan’s one of the most 
underdeveloped.   
Thereby, Kazakhstan’s services sector should be gradually liberalized, as in case with China, by 
agreeing to first liberalize distribution and professional services, while protecting some of its 
“infantry industries.” The necessity of liberalization and global market integration are undeniable for 
Kazakhstan. Thus, the country should continue its reforms intended to insure sound competitive 
environment, greater transparency, efficiency, and reduce the government’s involvement in the 
private sector. Nevertheless, it should do so at its own pace. The undisputed right of doing so is 
envisaged by the GATS and Kazakhstan should in sectors where it is prepared to make 
commitments, list its reservations to market access and national treatment.  However, it should 
assume no commitments with respect to sectors not suggested to be inscribed in its schedule.  One 
might call this a sector-by-sector, top down or negative list approach. 
Since the power industry is one of the most attractive service sectors it is evident that no country 
can secure a complete protection to it. In line with the GATS rules, in sectors inscribed in its 
schedules, countries can list limitations on market access and national treatment by spelling out in 
some detail the products on which they are not making a market access or national treatment 
commitment, and/or the precise manner in which market access or national treatment commitments 
are circumscribed with respect to such products.  Alternatively, a country may list the specific 
provisions in its laws for which it is taking a reservation with respect to either market access or 
national treatment.  In some cases a country may state that the commitment applies only to certain 
products or subsectors within a sector, and that it is making no commitments in other products or 
sub sectors. 
In other words GATS’ approach to making commitments means that members are not obliged to 
do so on the whole universe of services sectors. The accessing country’s government may not want 
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to make a commitment on the level of foreign competition in a given sector, because it considers the 
sector to be a core governmental function or indeed for any other reason. In this case, the 
government’s only obligations are minimal, for example to be transparent in regulating the sector, 
and not to discriminate between foreign suppliers. 
Based on the GATS provisions, which allow selective approach to each sector and service type, 
Kazakhstan can continue its further services area liberalization, in particular case the power industry 
liberalization, along its plan for further power industry restructuring and development within the 
next 5-10 years. By clearly assessing its strategic goals and WTO obligation for continued trade 
barriers reduction and liberalization, Kazakhstan can achieve growth in its own generating 
capacities.  
There are several comparative advantages that the Government of Kazakhstan is intended to use 
in order to accelerate development of its domestic power industry: 
• Kazakhstan has attractive opportunities to use wind energy, particularly in the Djungar Gate 
regions and in the Chilik corridor, where average annual wind speed is 7-9 m/sec and 5-9 
m/sec respectively.  The proximity of existing power lines, sound correlation between the 
windy season and growth in electricity demand creates the right conditions for effective use 
of these resources.  
• Kazakhstan is characterised by its significant solar energy resources.  Annually, it receives 
2,200-3,000 hours of sun annually, generating 1,300-1,800 kW/m² a year.  This enables the 
use of solar water heaters and solar batteries, particularly portable photoelectrical systems on 
farms in agricultural regions.  
• Kazakhstan’s hydraulic potential is estimated roughly at 170 TW a year, only 7-8 million 
kW a year of these are currently produced (8,860.9 million kW/hr in 2002).  Small 
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hydroelectric stations, with an output of less than 10 MW, are of major significance.  
According to research, there are at least 435 potential small HES ranges with a total potential 
capacity of 1,380 MW and average annual electricity production of approximately 6 million 
kW/hr.  Several of these envisage the use of existing irrigation canals, thus needing minimal 
expense of time, resources and materials for them to come into operation. 
In addition, 
• Russia and Kazakhstan are intent on consistently realising their bilateral agreements on 
nuclear energy, particularly on the joint construction of the nuclear power plant at Lake 
Balkhash106. The construction cost for one nuclear plant in Kazakhstan is approximately 
US$2 billion.   
• In 2003 it is envisaged to increase electricity production by 6.5 percent, demand by 6.7 
percent, and to complete projects for creating Kazakhstan-Russian ventures using Ekibastuz-
2 to supply electricity to the Russian market.  
• Kazakhstan plans to annually increase its electricity production volumes, and to attain 86 
billion kW/h by 2015, with current demand volumes at 81 billion kW/h. In order to do so it 
would require rebuilding of several major energy installations. For this purposes an amount 
of roughly US$180-270 has been envisaged for the reconstruction of the Ekibastuz State 
Regional Electricity Station (SRES-1), forecasted to come into operation in 2010. Another 
major project - the construction of the third building of Ekibastuz SRES-2 with a capacity of 
500 MW will require additional US$190 million.  
• Work has begun on the reconstruction of the Ekibastuz-Barnaul Power Grid, facilitating the 
supply of electricity to the cities of Omsk and Uralsk (Russia).  
                                                 
106 Several months ago the Government of Kazakhstan has postponed its plans for the nuclear power plant construction for later 
period, since the overall situation in power generation is improving and if the trend continues Kazakhstan will be able to produce 
enough electricity in its power plants. Yet, due to Kazakh Government’s interest in establishing a strong domestic innovative-
industrial base, the nuclear plant project remains of interest.     
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• In the next year KEGOC plans to allocate about 14.8 billion Tenge for the National 
Electricity Grid modernization project, which will include the installation of modern 
electrical equipment (valued at about 8.5 billion Tenge) and renewal of the 
telecommunications system by installing digital ATS, a system of guaranteed feed and HF 
channels (estimated cost around 2.5 billion Tenge);    
• Reconstruction of Ekibastuz-Barnaul 1,150 kW Overhead Power Line No. 1104 has begun, 
which will enable significant increase in the volume of inter-state power exchanges on 
Kazakhstan’s National Electricity Grid from Siberia to the Urals and to the Omsk region of 
Russia; 
Recently the Project to construct the second section of the “North-South” transit 500 kW Overhead 
Power Line has been approved by the Government. The significance of the project is that it will 
provide a reliable energy supply to the southern part of Kazakhstan, which does not have sufficient 
power plants and is forced to import electricity from abroad107. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite the progress Kazakhstan has already made in liberalizing its power industry, the 
country has a long way to go. The WTO accession will push for further reforms in Kazakhstan’s 
economy. Nevertheless, the country’s leadership is strongly committed to joining WTO and 
accepting its rights and regulations. It is also strongly committed to further reforms in power 
generation, targeted to deepening market transformation, establishment and development of 
exchange trading of electricity, broadening the range of electricity-related services.  
 According to the Government’s Innovative-Industrial Development Strategy, the country 
needs to understand that one of the major tasks is to reduce energy-intensity, which still remains 3-4 
times higher than in advanced countries. It is clear that artificially low electricity tariffs hinder the 
                                                 
107The Caspian World, Kazakhstan Energy Sector Overview, http://caspianworld.com/en/go/1915085189/935301147/342827978/#4 
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resolution of this problem, since nobody saves cheap resources. On the other hand, it is also evident 
that by supporting and providing unjustified low tariffs, as a means of support, to the processing 
industry the government in return gets to bare not only the burden of direct subsidies but also the 
weight of collecting less taxes.  
Pursuit of reform in services is no easy task, and there is often a need to balance the scope of 
promoting greater competition with the legitimate role that exists for the government to intervene in 
order to offset market failures and to achieve non-economic objectives, such as the universal 
provision of education or health care services. 
Kazakhstan thereby, should make all the possible efforts so its national schedule would 
reflect the reality of its situation, i.e. that full liberalization of trade barriers cannot be achieved over 
night and that not every country can move at the same pace. Its sectoral agreements should reflect 
the fact that liberalization of trade in some sectors cannot be separated from the establishment of 
compatible regulatory regimes, and in some cases the modification of the current international 
regulatory regime.  
Reforming the regulatory system in services, and thoughtfully opening up the market to 
wider domestic and international competition is thus, very much in Kazakhstan’s domestic 
economic interest. These reforms cannot be accomplished overnight, since both the government and 
the industry need time to assess the situation as well as necessary knowledge and skills. Moreover, 
since economic dislocations and consequences accompany all reforms, they need to be implemented 
at a socially acceptable pace of adjustment.   
The need for a phased implementation of reforms, however, is not an argument for a delay in 
mapping out a long-term game plan for reform and to expand the process of reform. The 
establishment of long-term reform targets and a phased plan for implementing reforms creates a 
more predictable environment for enterprises, encouraging risk taking. Kazakhstan’s Electricity 
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Association believes that the overall conditions of the power industry will improve if the state 
foresees transparent, predictable and non-discriminatory policies, which will allow potential 
investors to clearly appraise their costs and prospective profits, while also serving as a stimulus for 
stability in order to attract investment. To establish such environment, the Government needs to 
insure that the tariffs are formed by the market forces, and not by artificial alteration done in order to 
bring the maximum tariff rates in line with the Indicative Plan of Socio-Economic Development of 
Kazakhstan108. Assuring that the tariffs are not unjust and responsive to the market will encourage 
the power industry companies to invest in their businesses. This is an essential precondition taking 
into account that number of investment projects is limited as a result of high costs. According to the 
figures provided by the Kazakhstani Electricity Association, estimated calculations show that 
investment of about US$2 billion in electricity generation would lead to the increase of electric 
power prices by 0.25-0.3 cents per 1 kWh on average by 2015109.  At the same time, existing 
understated tariffs that do not include investment component do not stimulate energy saving and 
lead to high electricity consumption (3.34 kWh per US$1 of GDP in Kazakhstan whereas it is 0.44 
cents in the USA and 0.17 cents in Sweden and Japan). 
 Despite all, the country should pursue its liberalization process, understand that investing in 
energy sector is a necessity and that it can lead to price growth on electric power and, respectively, 
on goods of first priority. Thereby, it is as well important that the sectoral market opening be done 
gradually, at least at the very beginning stage, so the Kazakhstani population could understand and 
accept this necessity, which would contribute to the social and economic development of the country. 
The escalation of tariffs for services of natural monopolies, and electricity in particular, is 
unavoidable and is market forces driven. Thus, growing tariffs and resulted increased prices on 
                                                 
108 The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan prepares an Indicative Plan of Socio-Economic Development of the country for 
the period of three years. It is not an unusual matter that in order to comply with the set limits and tariffs, the Governmental agencies, 
such as the Antimonopoly Agency, intentionally keep tariffs from rising.    
109 Kazakhstan Electricity Association, Plans on implementation of national policy of further power sector development, section 
“Tariff Policy,” November 2003 
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consumer goods, need to be addressed not by artificially held low tariffs or subsidies to the 
manufacturing and processing industries, since both are contrary to the WTO rules as well as the 
market economy principle, but rather through special social protection programs designed to 
increase the minimum wage, minimum pensions, and other support to the most unprotected layers of 
population. On top, an introduction of energy saving program and sustainable development program 
might be very helpful in preventing a negative effect on the country’s economy. Last but not least, 
the industry itself should play an important role in joining the efforts of power generators, 
transmission organizations and consumers for achieving the state goal to provide reliable  and 
market compatible electric supply. 
 
 
KAZAKHSTAN’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY AND TRIPS AFFECT ON IT 
Liberalization of telecommunications markets started back in February 1997 when 70 
countries, accounting for 90% of the world telecom revenues, pledged in varying degrees to open 
their markets to foreign competition. The WTO/GATS agreement accelerated changes in 
telecommunications industry, since it opened the signatories’ markets to competition, increased 
market access, lessened foreign ownership restrictions110. 
In 1997, the WTO members signed the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services as the 
annex to the GATS. This agreement combined binding commitments on market access from its 
participants with a statement of “procompetitive regulatory principles” that have rapidly become the 
definition of the policy revolution under way in this market. The Annex requires each Member to 
ensure that all service suppliers seeking to take advantage of scheduled commitments are accorded 
                                                 
110 Abrenica, Joy and Warren, Tony, “Towards The Millennium Round: East Asia And The International Trade In 
Telecommunications Services,” World Bank, July 1999, p.4 
 90
access to and use of public basic telecommunications, both networks and services, on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory basis. 
According to the Paragraph 5.8 of the Annex on Telecommunications: 
“Consistent with their levels of development, developing country members may place 
reasonable conditions on access to, and use of, public telecommunications transport 
networks and services. These conditions are those necessary to strengthen the domestic 
telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity of the developing country member, 
and to increase its participation in international trade in telecommunications services.” 
Therefore, it is not an immediate matter for Kazakhstan to worry about rapid 
telecommunications market liberalization. Yet, it will have to do so eventually, after the grace 
period, which it will most likely try to bargain in bilateral WTO talks, if the government decides to 
protect its telecommunications sector. It is clear that the telecommunications in Kazakhstan requires 
substantial investment besides that which has already been invested. To attract new capital an 
adequate legal and regulatory framework is needed. This is key to fostering private-sector 
investment and confidence in the telecom sector and the country in general.  
According to the latest developments, the Kazakhstani Government is intended to liberalize its 
telecommunication market by 2005. It has approved the Program on Development of 
Telecommunications Industry for the years 2003-2005, which offers step-by-step liberalization of 
the telecommunications market and fostering competitive environment that would encourage new 
service providers to enter the market. By that time the government is planning to conduct major 
reconstruction and modernization projects in the telecommunications sector. The Government of 
Kazakhstan adopted the Programme on Demonopolization and Liberalisation of the 
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Telecommunications Market in Kazakhstan and is planning to generate investments of over US$1 
billion annually in its telecommunications industry by 2005111. 
The restructuring projects under the Kazakhtecelom’s “Telecommunication Network 
Modernization and Development Program” are aimed at increasing the level of telecommunications 
quality and its accessibility. It is envisaged that by 2005 the National Information Super Highway 
and National Data Network will be successfully constructed. Another goal is to proceed with 
modernization and development of local telephone network to meet requirements of residential and 
business customers in communications services. Creation of the National Satellite Network will 
make it possible for those living in sparsely populated areas with inefficient telephone and Internet 
access with state-of-the-art telecommunication services. According to the latest data, in 2002 
Kazakhstan’s telecommunications market was estimated to be worth US$570 million. Kazakhstan's 
government aims to grow the market to US$700 million by 2005, with the majority of the additional 
revenues going to new operators112.  
 
Kazakhstan’s telecommunications sector overview 
After gaining its independence in 1991 Kazakhstan was among the first former USSR countries 
to restructure its telecommunications sector. In 1994 the Government had created National Joint 
Stock Company “Kazakhtelecom,” which was formed on the basis of the Soviet state owned 
telecommunications enterprise and was under the authority of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of 
Communications. On February 20, 1997 the Kazakhtelecom was reformed into an Open Joint Stock 
Company Kazakhtelecom. In May 1997, the Kazakhstan government sold a 40-percent stake in 
Kazakhtelecom to South Korea's Daewoo Corporation. By February 1998, Daewoo Corporation sold 
                                                 
111 11th Central Asian International Exhibition "Telecommunications and Computer Technologies," The News of 
Telecommunications Market, KITEL-2004, http://www.kitel.kz/en/2004/desc/ 
112 Intelecon Research & Consultancy Ltd., World Dialogue on Regulation for network economies, 
“Kazakhstan to sell a portion of its 50% stake in Kazakhtelecom,” May 12, 2003,  
http://www.regulateonline.org/intelecon/2003/May_2003/A-Kazakhstan-030512.htm  
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three-quarters of its holdings to Kazkommertsbank, a large Kazakhstan private bank. Later, 
Kazkommertsbank sold 10 percent of its Kazakhtelecom shares mainly to Western investors and 
held the remaining 30 percent, which Kazkommertsbank hoped to sell off to a "strategic partner" 
with experience in the development and operations of telecommunication networks113. 
Under the Government’s General License No.1 in the field of telecommunications 
Kazakhtelecom enjoys the exclusive rights to create, construct, install, operate and maintain the 
country’s Public Telecommunications Network. In addition, the company exercises monopolistic 
rights in providing long distance and international communication services.  
In 1995 Kazakhstan’s telephone density for each 100 people was at 14 telephone numbers per 
hundred people, 7 rural and 18 urban114. It placed the country as fifth among the CIS states, but the 
government set a goal to triple the density within the next five to 10 years. At present, the telephone 
density per 100 urban inhabitants is 20,5 telephones. The Company serves more than 1.7 million 
urban and 377,000 rural telephone services subscribers, and the total installed capacity is at 2.4 
million lines. The digitalization level of the local network is at 45 percent with a 16 percent increase 
from the year 2000. Kazakhtelecom has established ties with 154 foreign telecommunication 
companies and 17 operators in the CIS and the Baltic States, offering quality communication 
services with over 230 countries of the world115. The company’s share in the long-distance services 
market is equal to 92 percent, international communication with the CIS countries – 89 percent, and 
with the rest of foreign countries – 79 percent. 
 The payphone network system, which became almost none existent after the Soviet Union 
breakdown due to discontinuation of manufacturing payphones and new system incompatibility, is 
now rapidly emerging. For instance, 5 706 payphones are now available for use with the phone card 
around the country, covering all cities and every rural area. The payphones are imported from two 
                                                 
113 International Tax and Investment Center, http://www.iticnet.org/publications/TwnsndCom.pdf 
114 Kazakhstan Gateway, Economy, Telecommunications Overview, http://www.kazakhstan-
gateway.kz/economy/communications/index.htm 
115OJSC “Kazakhtelecom,” Company Overview, November 2003  
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foreign manufacturers – Schlumberger Company of France and Spanish Siemens Elasa. According 
to the 2002 annual report of the Kazakhtelecom almost 1000 payphones had been installed in the 
2002116.         
The company has acquired credit rating from major international rating agencies such as 
Standard & Poor's and Fitch.  Its rating has been increased by the Fitch rating agency from “BB-” 
to “BB,” and has a “stable outlook. 117 ” Due to its importance to Kazakhstan’s economy, 
Kazakhtelecom’s share in the GDP is at 1.5 percent, and good credit history, the national 
telecommunications operator has been enlisted into the Official List of the Kazakhstan Stock 
Exchange as well as into the Program of State "Blue Chips" Stocks Sale118. 
Kazakhstan's telecommunications sector has been undergoing a major transformation in the 
recent years and is currently one of the most advanced in the CIS. The so-called Intelligent Network 
has been introduced. The Network provides such services as prepaid card calling, account card 
calling, credit card calling, freephone service which is more commonly known as “toll free”, 
charged information service, which allows the initial service subscriber to get additional income by 
providing further service to the end use, and televoting, which is becoming increasingly popular 
among the polling and television companies that use it for conducting public opinion surveys. By 
2005 the construction of a 10,000 km National Information Super Highway (NISH) covering all the 
regions of Kazakhstan is planned to be completed.  NISH will be the shortest telecommunications 
route running from Europe to China, Japan and Southeast Asia, which will allow Kazakhstan to 
become the main transit centre between Europe and Asia. 
The construction of the Fiber Optical Communication Line, which is envisaged to 
incorporate 6 regional and 29 local centers comprising a national through traffic operation and 
                                                 
116 OJSC “Kazakhtelecom” Annual Report - 2002, p.15 
117 OJSC “Kazakhtelecom” Annual Report - 2002, p.9 
118 Kazakhstan Investment Promotion Center, Investment Climate, Press Release, Business-Forum “Kazakhstan – Europe: 
Investments and trade”, November 5-6, 2003, Budapest, Hungary 
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digitalization of the whole territory, was started in 2002, and its first - Eastern section has been 
successfully completed. A large-scale National Satellite Network Construction Project is also being 
implemented119. 
At the end of this year the company has signed the Loan Agreement with the consortium of 
international banks led by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for the total 
amount of US$110 million, in order to restructure its debts and modernize the network. The new loan is 
an addition to Kazakhtelecom’s 1999 loan of US$50 million from EBRD, yet it is the first 
syndicated one120. Finance is arranged jointly by the EBRD and Standard Bank London. EBRD is 
providing US$60 million of its own funds with a seven-year maturity, while the remaining US$50 
million is being syndicated to five commercial banks (Standard Bank London, Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank Bsterreich, Citibank, Credit Lyonnais and WestLB AG) with a five-year maturity121.  
The timing of the deal is not accidental, as the government is planning to proceed with 
greater market liberalization for its telecommunications sector. The access the Kazakhstani national 
operator gained to international capital markets through this transaction is intended to help optimize 
funding costs and invest in developing the network. Currently, the Kazakhstani government has a 
stake of 51 percent share in the company122. In efforts to help the Kazakhstani government promote 
a transparent regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector, a number of foreign legal 
experts have been recruited to provide the authorities with technical assistance. Thus, for instance, 
Japan and Taipei China have each given US$200,000, while the European Union has provided 
US$364,000 for successful implementation of the telecommunications sector privatization program. 
Along with the provided technical assistance various domestic governmental agencies and 
companies in the telecommunications sector organize special presentations, conferences and 
                                                 
119 Kazakhtelecom’s Press Release, September 2003, www.kazakhtelecom.kz  
120 Wallis, Richard, “EBRD Supports Largest Telecoms Operator In Central Asia”, EBRD Press Release, December 3, 1999 
121 Stedman, Michael, “Kazakh Telecoms Leader Wins $110 Million Eyeing Market” Reform, Pravda Newspaper, June 10, 2003 
122 International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators Database, October 9, 2003, 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/world/world.html  
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exhibitions in order to promote the prospected privatization program and increase public awareness 
of it. One of such promotional conferences was held in Istanbul, in April of last year and was 
dedicated to highlighting investment opportunities of the Kazakhstani telecommunications sector. 
“Kazakhstan - Regional and International Overview of Investment Opportunities in Kazakhstan’s 
Telecom Industry” was organised by the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and several international companies, such as International Trade and Exhibitions (JV) 
Ltd (Great Britain), EUF (Turkey), Iteca (Central Asia and the Caucasus), and Business Events 
Management Ltd (Great Britain), OJSC “Kazakhtelecom,” and Kazakhstani cellular phone company 
“Kcell.123” The exhibition on Kazakhstan’s telecommunications and IT industry promotion - Astana 
KITEL, has turned into an annual event and is becoming increasingly popular among domestic and 
foreign companies in attracting new investment into the sector. The fifth annual exhibition – Astana 
KITEL-2003 was visited by more than 70 telecommunications and IT companies from 15 
countries124.    
Along with Kazakhtelecom, a number of other telecommunications service providers operate in 
the Kazakhstan market: Kazinformtelecom (KIT), Nursat, Jaryk, SA Telcom, and KAZINTEL. The 
above companies provide such services as Internet, Infotel international network, international 
Intelsat-based satellite communications network, paging, and satellite television. KAZINTEL 
Company comprised of three well-known Kazakhstan telecommunications companies such as Arna, 
Astel, and Ratel, serves as the local telephone communications operator in Almaty city, as well as 
provides data transmission and satellite communications systems.  
In March 1999, GSM-standard cellular phone service was introduced in Kazakhstan. Two GSM 
operators emerged in the Kazakhstan telecommunications market. “K'cell” is Kazakhstan-Turkish 
joint venture formed by the national operator between Kazakhtelecom, which holds 49 percent of 
                                                 
123 Ministers of Turkey, Caspian Region and Central Asia Meet at Annual Regional Telecommunications Summit and Exhibition in 
Istanbul, Kazakhstan Press Club, April 14-16, 2002 
124 Astana KITEL-2003, Press Release, September 9-11, 2003 http://www.astanakitel.iteca.kz/ru/2003/desc/ 
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the shares and Turkcell, owner of the 51 percent of the shares125. “K-Mobile” is a joint venture of 
the Kazakhstani Investel Company and Turkish Rumeli Telecom, each has 30 and 70 percent of the 
shares respectively126.  
The long-awaited arrival of GSM to Kazakhstan has resulted in strong downward pressure on 
AMPS standard-based cellular equipment and services in Kazakhstan. Launching of two competing 
GSM operators resulted in much lower prices and new services, thereby making mobile service 
available to the Kazakhstani middle class. For instance, prior to the introduction of competition in 
the cellular services market the number of mobile service subscribers was at about 30,000. Altel the 
first mobile operator, formed through a Kazakhstan-British joint venture with Wireless Technology 
Corporation, had virtually exclusive monopolistic rights as the second mobile company “Zharshi” 
had a tiny share of the market. The dramatic boom in mobile services, which has started with the 
introduction of competition in the mobile services market, has been successfully continuing with the 
annual growth of nearly 200% being recorded in 2002127.  
Recently the Government has adopted a program on further development of telecommunications 
sector and has announced its plans to introduce the third generation cellular services in the Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA 2000) format. The Committee on Telecommunications Services 
and Information under the Ministry of Transport and Communications has already conducted the 
tender in accordance with the Law on Government Procurement and awarded the lines at 800 MHz 
and 450 MHz radio frequencies to the tender winner, which are Altel and Zharshi 128 . 
Kazakhtelecom according to the latest information is planning to develop mobile services in less 
attractive rural areas of the country. 
                                                 
125K-Cell Company Information, K-Cell Website, http://www.kcell.kz/en/company/ 
126K-Mobile Company Information, K-Mobile Website, http://www.k-mobile.kz/ru/company/ 
127The Global Information Inc., 2003 Information Highways and Telecommunications In Asia: Volume 8: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bhutan, Brunei, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 9th Edition, 
June 2003 http://www.gii.co.jp/english/pa14618_information_highways_v8.html 
128Kazakhstan Is Going To Develop the CDMA Format Mobile Services Network, CDMA Kazakhstan, June 3, 2003 
http://www.cdma.kz/script_site.html?id=149 
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CONCLUSION  
The overall situation with the development and reformation of the Kazakhstani 
telecommunications sector is positive. The country has been able to revitalize its telecoms industry, 
by constantly upgrading it and replacing the Soviet time, outdated equipment with the services and 
equipment of international class. The national operator, monopolistic company Kazakhtelecom has 
proved itself to be a profitable enterprise with good management strategy. According to the 
company’s year 2002 financial report, its net profits in 2002 rose by 59 percent compared to 2002, 
amounting to a total of 11,558 million Tenge, which is 4,282 million Tenge greater than in the 
previous year.129  The company is also one of the major taxpayers. In 2002, for example, the total 
amount of taxes it paid was equal to 13.2 billion Tenge130.  
Despite the seeming success of the telecoms industry in Kazakhstan it is evident that such 
success was largely possible due to the closeness and protection of Kazakhstan’s 
telecommunications market. Thus, the Government of the country implemented protectionist 
measures, such as awarding exclusive monopolistic rights on virtually all telecoms services to the 
national operator Kazakhtelecom, has been a major reason for the company’s and industry’s 
successful development and expansion. Even though it is hard to accuse the national telecoms 
operator in not having an incentive to provide the best services and not being a profitable enterprise, 
it is still clear that once competition is introduced into Kazakhstan’s telecommunications market, the 
Kazakhstani telecoms customers will enjoy lower prices, higher quality services, a wider array of 
service choices, and latest technology, because the new operators along with the exiting ones would 
have to provide better and lower cost services in order to compete in the market. In it turn, a more 
efficient telecommunications sector will improve the efficiency of numerous business endeavors, 
                                                 
129 Kazakhtelecom’s Annual Report, 2002, p.9 http://www.kazakhtelecom.kz/eng/financy/ar_eng.pdf 
130 The Ministry of Finance’s Tax Committee Annual Report – 2002, http://mf.minfin.kz/  
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thereby boosting the whole country’s economy. An improved telecommunications infrastructure will 
also help attract increased levels of foreign direct investment. 
In addition with the near future prospect of joining WTO, there is no other choice for 
Kazakhstan’s Government but to realize the necessity and importance of demonopolizing and 
liberalizing the telecoms industry. Thereby, the Government has already undertaken its first steps 
towards the market liberalization and pursuant to its commitments is determined to complete this 
process in the next several years. The transition from a state monopoly to a liberalized market 
requires Kazakhstan to undergo a complete revision of its telecommunications regulatory framework, 
since efficient legislative and regulatory frameworks are critical success factors for liberalization. 
Thus, telecom regulators such as the Kazakhstani Ministry of Transport and Communications must 
be independent from governments and at equal distance from all operators, in particular the 
dominating ones. The government on a non-discriminatory basis must guarantee access rights to all 
competitors.   
One prime objective of regulating telecommunications is to protect the interests of customers. 
Inefficient public operators, or greedy private licensees, usually overprice telecom services. 
Regulatory authorities, therefore, are requested to raise awareness amongst customers in order to 
enable them making informed spending. In monopolistic or partially liberalized markets, regulation 
is viewed as a substitute for competition. Whereas in fully liberalized markets, competitive forces 
provide some sort of self-regulation. However, the net effect of telecom regulations in the Arab 
countries is unclear. It will take sometime to have a reliable record of accomplishment.  
Nevertheless, according to a report by Interfax, the government of Kazakhstan intends to end 
Kazakhtelecom's exclusivity in the domestic and international long-distance markets by the end of 
2003, earlier than previously planned. The government’s existing liberalization plans for the 
telecommunications sector call for Kazakhtelecom to lose its long-distance services monopoly in the 
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first quarter of 2004. The government also plans to prepare the legal and regulatory groundwork for 
the liberalization of the telecoms sector this year, and to develop a mechanism for financing rural 
operators. 
The Committee on Communications and Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan has been 
given until the end of 2003 to prepare for equalizing communications services tariffs and to develop 
a mechanism for financing unprofitable telecoms services through the introduction of fees for access 
to international bandwidth for alternative operators. In general, liberalization is expected to result in 
a reduction in long-distance tariffs and an improvement in service quality. 
In general, I believe that opening up the telecommunications sector to private telecom 
service providers would have several positive effects not only on Kazakhstan’s telecoms industry, 
but on its economy in general. First of all, because demonopolization will naturally result in increase 
of telecoms service providers, it will decrease the unsatisfied demand for telecommunications 
services. Secondly, new service providers will precede attempts to expand their customer bases by 
lowering rates and improving their services. They will also want to try to expand their overall 
customer base, which will require investment in physical infrastructure. 
In addition, there are number of areas, especially rural ones, which still do not have adequate and 
in some cases any telecommunication services. Therefore, the new market comers can be possible 
investors into the services for rural and small town areas.  As a result, of such investments, which 
could become possible with the market liberalization, Kazakhstan’s overall tele-density will increase.  
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s businesses will also benefit from telecoms market liberalization, as 
the telecoms infrastructure becomes more efficient, tele-density increases, services quality improves 
and prices drop. The numerous companies and businesses would have to spend less time and effort 
in order to get access to high quality, reliable telecoms services. They will also have to spend less 
money on communication with their customers and business partners as the tariff rates decrease as a 
result of competition.  
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Finally, the telecoms market liberalization will increase the amount of foreign direct investment 
into Kazakhstan. For instance, at the current time, foreign companies looking for investment 
opportunities abroad, might very well be turned off by the inefficient communications services and 
its expensiveness. Hence, once the telecommunications sector is liberalized, and service quality, 
prices, and reliability improve, Kazakhstan will be far more attractive to foreign companies wishing 
to establish themselves not only in Kazakhstan but also in the Central Asia region, as Kazakhstan is 
the best choice for doing so.   
On top the liberalization will speed up the process of integrating Kazakhstan into the global 
trading community as well as into the global telecommunications community. The Trans Asia-
Europe Optical Fiber Cable (TAE) project that begun in August of 1995, is a good opportunity to do 
so. This international fiber-optics communication line is envisaged to connect China, Central Asia, 
Iran, and Turkey with the European continent, with future outlets to the U.S. via Japan. In 1998 the 
southern branch of TAE (1750 km) went into operation, and construction of the western branch 
(2500 km) began in April 1999131. The rapid and successful development of telecommunications in 
Kazakhstan has already encouraged several foreign manufacturers and suppliers, such as Motorola, 
Lucent Technologies, Ericsson, Siemens, Alcatel, Nokia, Daewoo, and Nortel, to establish a 
presence in the Kazakhstani telecoms market. Yet, considering high demand for telecommunications 
products and services in the oil, gas, power generation, banking, financial, aviation, and 
governmental sectors, liberalization of the Kazakhstan’s telecoms market will attract even more 
foreign companies, i.e. foreign investment.  
Finally, while it is obvious that the market liberalization will first of all hurt the current 
market leaders such as Kazakhtelecom and limited number of mobile phone companies, it is as well 
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clear that we are coming close to the time when competition and a free market will be reality in the 
telecommunications sector in Kazakhstan. The WTO accession of Kazakhstan will serve as a 
stimulus for such process, and in accordance with the WTO and specific GATS provisions will 
ensure non-discriminatory treatment, market accessibility and open competition in the country. 
Open competition, once allowed, will bring currently artificially and unjustifiably high set long 
distance, international calling service, Internet, satellite and mobile services prices down, which will 
provide a greater number of Kazakhstani population with the opportunity to get access to the 
telecommunications services.  
 
Kazakhstan’s Membership In Regional Trade Arrangements And How They Affect On 
Kazakhstan’s WTO Accession 
When a WTO member enters into a regional integration arrangement through which it grants more 
favorable conditions to its trade with other parties to that arrangement than to other WTO members’ 
trade, it is contrary to the basic WTO principle of non-discrimination and most favored nation 
treatment such as envisaged by the GATT’s Article I of the GATT and the GATS’ Article II. 
Nevertheless, WTO member countries are allowed to enter into such arrangements under specific 
conditions, which are spelled out in three major sets of rules. 
For instance, Paragraphs 4-10 of the Article XXIV of the GATT, where Paragraph 4 
provides for the formation and operation of customs unions and free-trade areas covering trade in 
goods, it states that: 
“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of 
the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs 
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union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories 
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.”  
The 1979 Decision on “Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation Of Developing Countries” or the so-called “Enabling Clause,” permits preferential 
trade arrangements in trade in goods between WTO’s developing country members. In addition, the 
GATT’s Article V “Economic Integration” provides the possibility to conclude regional trade 
agreements in the services trade area both for developed and developing countries.  
Therefore, the formation of regional trading blocks and customs unions in principle is not 
inconsistent or in violation of the WTO rules. Yet, formation of the preferential regional agreements 
is possible only if those arrangements do not increase the overall trade barriers and impose more 
restrictive trade environment for those WTO members, which are not party to the regional trade 
agreement.   
It is a continuing trend that the regionalism or the formation of different free trade areas and 
customs unions is becoming more and more popular around the world. During the last decade the 
world has witnessed a major prevalence of regional trading arrangements. Even the so far 
conservative East Asian countries were very successful in forming new regional agreements in order 
to promote greater trade and secure their geo-political interests. The regional trade agreements cover 
virtually all aspects of trade, ranging from services and labor mobility to environment and rules of 
origin. Thus, for example, since the creation of the GATT in 1947, 254 regional trade arrangements 
have been notified and over 130 of them were notified after 1995132. According to the latest study 
conducted by the OECD, the preferential regional trade agreements already account for 43% of 
                                                 
132The World Trade Organization Website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
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world trade, and this is expected to increase to 55% by 2005 if all the regional trade agreements 
currently in the pipeline are realized133.  
Nevertheless, while it is clear that the preferential regional trade agreements can be a good 
complement to the global trade it can in no way replace the necessity for multilateral trade, 
including coherent multilateral rules and progressive multilateral liberalization. Indeed the basic 
framework in which most if not all of the regional trade arrangements work now, are based on the 
rules and regulations, and cover those sectors highlighted by the multilateral trade and the WTO. 
The distinctive feature of the regional trade agreements, which explains its attractiveness, is that 
they frequently expand beyond set WTO provisions by containing ones that are more far-reaching in 
a wide range of sectors. Such flexibility is possible due to limited number of participants and greater 
easiness of negotiations. For instance, in trade in services almost all regional trade blocks adopt a 
“top-down” or “negative-list approach,” which means greater liberalization.  
In addition, with the labor mobility, regional trade agreements often offer greater 
accessibility and opportunities for temporary movement of service suppliers. Such provisions often 
include full national treatment, guaranteed special market access for service suppliers and facilitated 
access for certain groups134. 
Matters concerning investment and government procurement also are of greater scope in the 
regional trade agreements. Thus, they envisage special rights to establish a presence in other 
countries covered by the trade agreement, and in case with the government procurement they usually 
have larger scope of commitments and greater access.    
The formation of the regional trade arrangements also gives an opportunity for the member 
countries to form unified legal basis, which in its turn, allows for greater and faster protection and 
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enforcement of the intellectual property rights. On top, such regional blocks allow its member 
countries to be more precise with the trade remedies such as safeguards, antidumping and subsidies. 
In fact, the provisions often contain strong regulations prohibiting such trade remedies as subsidies. 
Finally, regional trade arrangements give a chance to those countries, which are not yet 
WTO members, to also enjoy freer trade and promote trade liberalization on a narrower basis.  
 
OVERVIEW OF KAZAKHSTAN’S REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS  
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, the post-Soviet states had to face 
the rest of the world in the age of rapidly accelerating globalization. The task of 
smooth and quick integration into the new world posed serious challenges to all of 
the post-Soviet republics. Since, globalization has a distinguishing characteristic of 
rewarding those who can effectively practice and keep up with it, while harshly 
punishing those states, which fail to do so, former Soviet states had no other choice 
but to come together to form an alliance of states, which could help them to 
incorporate into the world community faster and with lesser casualties.  
The overriding objective, to which all of the post-Soviet states agreed in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan in December 1991, was to sign the agreement establishing the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The original goal of creating the CIS in late 1991 was to ensure the 
genuine sovereignty and political independence of the republics, while preserving a “common 
economic space” of the Soviet period135. 
The realization that the CIS system was not efficient and strong enough to make the 
member states to comply with the goals and obligations they had under the agreement, led many 
member-states to search for some other ways of integration, in a form of sub-regional, more 
                                                 
135Suezawa Megumi, “Falling Apart or Coming Together? Processes of Decentralization and Integration in the CIS” http://src-
h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/86/suezawa.pdf 
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narrowly defined cooperation than the CIS. On the other hand, the CIS countries realized that 
despite their wish to integrate into wider and more impressive communities such as the European 
Union or NATO, for Ukraine and Belarus’ for instance, or form a coalition with Turkey, for the 
Central Asian states like Kazakhstan, the reality did not pose such opportunities for them. There 
were number of obstacles, such as differences in the levels of socio-economic development, 
domestic political instability, increasing threat of religious extremism and others. 
The Eurasian Economic Community or the "EvrAzEs," as it is known by its Russian 
language acronym, was the brainchild of Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev. The 
economic group comprised of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Russia, was founded 
on October 10, 2000 through the adoption of the Agreement on Institution of EEC by state-
participants of the Customs union, and began functioning in May of 2001136. The group represents 
the most ambitious effort yet to create Eurasian customs union and free trade zone since the 
breakdown of the USSR. The Agreement itself is a logical continuation of partnership, which started 
with the signing, on January 6, 1995, of the Agreements on Customs union between the Russian 
Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan, which was later, joined by the 
Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan. 
The basic goal of the EEC is to bring to realization the framework for Eurasian integration, which 
began with earlier interstate treaties and agreements such as the Customs Union Agreement. The 
EEC is designed to sponsor cooperation in five broad categories: free trade, customs, common 
market of products, services and labour, and currency, which will be accomplished through the 
monetary union 137 . Each of these categories is broken down further into specific spheres of 
cooperation. For instance, integration anticipates that inter-state coordination and policy 
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harmonization will require coordinated policies to promote a single labour market and coordinated 
labour migration policy. To do so the countries have agreed to unify/ bring into conformity their 
domestic legislation in such areas as labour standards, national educational standards, etc., to ensure 
that labour qualifications are recognized uniformly throughout the participating areas. 
The important addition in the EEC, which did not exist in the CIS system or the Customs 
union in its framework, is it official status. Somewhat like the GATT the EEC was not recognized as 
the international organization, and thus, compliance and enforcement of its rules, provisions and 
regulations was not binding, which led to inability for the Agreement to function as was foreseen. 
The EEC however, is a regional international organization and is now officially recognized as such 
by the United Nations138. While the EEC is not intended to limit the sovereignty of its member 
states, it does provide for the delegation to the EEC of some negotiating responsibilities within the 
international organizations. The organization is managed through the Inter-State Council, an 
Integration Committee, an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, and the Eurasian Economic Community’s 
Court. The chairmanship in Interstate Council and Integration Committee is rotated consequently in 
order of the alphabet by each state. The Secretariat of the Integration Committee is comprised of 85 
executives headed by the Secretary General, including 20 people working on quota basis: Russia – 8 
people, Belarus’ and Kazakhstan – 4 people each, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – 2 people each. 
According to the approved proposal 1/3 of the executives of the Integration Committee’s Secretariat 
are located in Almaty, Kazakhstan and 2/3 – in Moscow, Russia139. 
The significant advantage of the EEC in comparison with its predecessor the Customs union, 
is a system of decision making by "weighted voting." The weighted voting system is largely used by 
the international organizations and the regional trade arrangements, nevertheless, its adoption to the 
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EEC shows that the member states have studied and learned form the experience of various 
international organizations and made an effort to form their Community on real estimation of the 
situation. Thus, based on the financing and weighted voting scheme adopted by the Community, 
Russia exercises forty percent of the voting rights and is responsible for meeting forty percent of the 
organization’s operating expenses. Belarus and Kazakhstan each have twenty percent share. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan each have ten percent. The EEC Charter specifies that a vote on major 
policy issues will require two-thirds agreement. The voting formula would thus imply that, on any 
given major policy issue, Russia would have to have at least two other states supporting it to win a 
vote. On the other hand, it also implies that Russia will exercise veto power on major policy 
issues140. 
 
Positive Effects of the EEC 
First of all, the EEC is perceived by its members as a step towards ASEAN or NAFTA-style 
international policy agreement. Therefore, it allows thinking that the main purpose of the EEC is 
directed towards real interaction and not mere coexistence as in previous integrational attempts. 
Secondly, while the EEC is not intended to put any constraints on its members, it does include a 
common position representation within international organizations through its joint delegation.  
Third, all of the Community member states, except the Kyrgyz Republic which is WTO 
member since 1998, are vigorously interested and looking forward to joining WTO. Russia and 
Kazakhstan as large exporters of oil, gas, copper, aluminum, and steel are being undermined and 
injured by not being members of the WTO. For example, Russia and Kazakhstan due to not being 
WTO members experienced huge steel sales loss, as the United States’ Department of Trade 
imposed the safeguard measures on the imports of certain steel products last year. The European 
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Communities, Japan, Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand and Brazil made a 
complaint to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and on July 11, 2003 the WTO’s DSB 
issued report of the panel, concluding that “the safeguard measures imposed by the United States on 
the imports of certain steel products are inconsistent with the WTO Safeguards Agreement and 
GATT 1994.141” Nevertheless, the inability of Russia and Kazakhstan to take any sufficient action 
on this matter by themselves taught them a lesson, and in some way speed-up their WTO accession 
negotiations. In addition the US’ imposition of the antidumping measures showed that both 
countries have similar goals and face similar problems; thus, they should act jointly by launching 
synchronized customs-tariff policy, united position in relations with the WTO and other 
international economic organizations. The notion of common goal, as in the case with the EC, has 
become one of the main cornerstones of the EEC and is shared and promoted now, not only by 
Russia and Kazakhstan, but also by Tajikistan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. 
Speaking about additional advantages of the EEC, one must note that within its framework 
freer trade regime has already started to work and customs duties and other tariff and non-tariff 
restrictions are being progressively and constantly eliminated. For example, according to the EEC’s 
first Secretary General Gregoriy Rapota the antidumping measures, which existed in member 
countries, have been reduced from almost 20 to only 1, and abolishment procedure of the last 
remaining measure is being currently discussed by the member-states. The EEC’s program on 
“Development Priorities for the years 2003-2006” foresees harmonization of energy and 
transportation tariffs as one of its major and urgent goals. The recent establishment of a 
transnational transportation company “TransEurasia,” can be viewed as prove for existence of 
mutual commitment among the EEC member states. Further work towards establishment of the 
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Transportation Union and unification of railroad tariffs is also on its way142. The drafts of the 
“Agreement on exchange of information on transfer pricing among the customs and tax agencies of 
the member states”, and “Agreement on temporary work activities of the EEC member states” have 
been preliminary approved.           
On top, the countries are intended to establish a regional alliance of gas producers. When 
established such a group could play a similar function for the CIS countries as that played by the 
OPEC for the Persian Gulf oil producers143. The EEC member states are currently working on a 
project on joint extraction and development of hydrocarbon-energy resources of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan and formation and introduction of mutual tariff codes and classification system.  
The EEC by its nature can be the basis for economic stabilization and growth through the 
development of trade and production relations of the member states. Attracted by such opportunity, 
several other CIS states such as Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine currently hold an observer status in 
the organization144.   
 
Obstacles To Further Integration 
Despite seemingly active process of integration, the differences in social, economic and 
political levels of development and liberalization among the EEC member states, increasingly hinder 
its further development. For instance, according to the World Bank’s report and the development 
assistance/poverty reduction program sponsored by the World Bank, EBRD, ADB and the IMF, the 
seven low-income countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States include Armenia, 
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Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. As one can clearly 
see, the two of the so-called “CIS-7” are also members of the Eurasian Economic Community145.  
As stated in the IMF’s annual report on the overall economic performance of the CIS 
countries, the real GDP in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan declined in 2002, while the level of external 
trade remained especially low. The World Bank’s report indicates that the absolute poverty is very 
high: severe poverty (at PPP $2.15 per day) affects 18 percent of the population, and 52 percent are 
considered poor, having income below PPP $4.30 per day146. 
The Republic of Tajikistan is also among one of the least developed economies in the CIS. 
Thus, for example, based on the World Bank’s overall assessment of the economic situation in 
Tajikistan the absolute poverty is extremely high and undernutrition is significant. Severe poverty 
(at $2.15 per day) affects some 68 percent of the population, and over 95 percent are considered 
poor (below $4.30 per day). Poverty has increased significantly during the transition, as a result of 
dramatic GDP decline and sharp increase in inequality147. 
In addition, despite the EEC’s progress it still faces a lot of criticism from the skeptics and 
the opponents of the Community148. The critics claim that the EEC does not and cannot solve 
existing problems and set tasks. Indeed, they claim that the organization itself is rather a superficial 
body, which only addresses appearances and perceptions, and does little to over come them149. 
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Complications For Kazakhstan  
 Kazakhstan’s participation in the regional trade agreement such as the EEC is on the one 
hand beneficial and leads to trade liberalization, while on the other hand, serves as a hamper to its 
WTO negotiations and accession process.  
First of all, if we look back the EEC was initially designed as the customs union among five 
states. However, formation of the customs union was particularly difficult given different stages of 
WTO accession among the member states. Thereby, the establishment of common external tariff 
rate was not achieved and as a result the EEC members had to apply to the WTO individually and 
submit their own tariff schedules. In addition, in 1998, despite deep economic recession and 
industrial stagnation, the Kyrgyz Republic became the first CIS state to gain WTO membership. It 
did so by complying with the WTO rules and regulations and committing itself to an average 
customs duties tariff of 7,47%, provisioning limitations of the national regime and market access in 
the services trade, and limited government support to agriculture by 5%, similar to developed 
economies150.  
Following the Kyrgyz accession to the WTO, Russia and Kazakhstan complained that the 
WTO commitments made by the Kyrgyz violated the commitments they had made to their customs 
union partners and would cause trade deflection, not only in goods but also in services, in the light 
of porous customs controls between Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic151. The EEC members 
have come to realization that  the formation of the customs union was not as easily achieved as they 
thought and topped with the differing priorities for trade integration with non-CIS countries, 
prospect formation of a free-trade zone was perceived as more realistic goal. 
Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has lost almost two years and initial stimulus in pursuing WTO 
accession negotiations. Thus, on a unilateral base Kazakhstan took steps to reduce its trade barriers. 
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At present, for example, Kazakhstan trades with 137 WTO member countries and applies an average 
tariff rate at 8.6 percent, while items for “zero” to 15 percent tariff rate comprise 95 percent of all 
tradable commodity items152.      
The country’s WTO accession was also slowed down by the fact that the Customs union and later 
the EEC envisaged cooperative WTO negotiations. Thereby, Kazakhstan had to adopt to the pace of 
economically less developed and more restrictive Tajikistan and Belarus. In addition, since the CIS 
Agreement and the EEC provide preferential treatment to the member countries in the form of 
“zero” tariff rate on imports from member states, and greater market access, Kazakhstan had 
difficulties in WTO negotiations in justifying such preferential provisions. Finally, because deciding 
on official status and form of the regional trade arrangement took much time, it was impossible for 
Kazakhstan to clearly explain the purpose and structure of the regional trade agreement, as well as to 
take firm stand on where it was regarding the regional trade arrangement.  
Nevertheless, in overall assessment, the process of regional trade integration has been useful 
as political and economic trial case for the country. Thus, it was an example of how to conduct 
negotiation talks, clearly state your strategic interest and resources you are willing to sacrifice in 
order to achieve them. Taking into account Kazakhstan’s WTO accession process, I believe that the 
experience of the regional trade integration would be useful for more important and difficult process 
Kazakhstan’s accession to WTO. In particular, the misperceptions about the real degree of 
negotiations difficulty and needed time, suggest that Kazakhstani officials tend to seriously 
underestimate the complexity and political difficulty of such negotiations. Such finding could 
helpful in the country’s WTO negotiations, where clear assessment of the real situation is one of the 
essential elements to successful WTO accession. Integration with the CIS countries in the 
framework of the CIS, the Customs Union, the EEC, and recently announced formation of the 
Common Economic Space (CES) between Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, will be helpful 
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to the relevant government bureaucracies in gaining political and technical expertise in negotiating 
and implementing reductions in trade barriers.  
Finally, I believe, that the regional trade arrangements Kazakhstan became part of showed the 
international community Kazakhstan’s commitment to liberalization. in particular, the regional 
integration was always targeted towards greater multilateral cooperation, deeper partnership 
integration and more trade liberalization. The CIS, the Customs Union, and the EEC all were 
advocates for tariff and non-tariff trade barriers reduction and expansion of trade both in goods and 
services.  
 
THESIS CLOSING REMARKS 
 
 
Based on the experiences of the countries, which have successfully transformed from closed 
economies to free trade market ones, there are a number of economic gains from such transition as 
they benefit from specialization and more efficient resource allocation. The reduction of trade 
barriers such as quantitative restrictions, unjustifiably high tariff rates and other non-tariff obstacles, 
has been one of the major goals of the international community. The successful initiation of such 
liberalization processes and formation of the binding WTO rules and regulations have been 
recognized as the main achievements of the international community in economic area 
multilateralism.  
Nevertheless, due to the difficulties and multiple obstacles faced by the developing and least 
developed nations and often doubtful commitment of the developed WTO member countries to 
address such concerns, contrary to the economic rational there are still numerous opponents and 
critics of the WTO system and multilateral trade liberalization around the world. 
Such opponents have doubted WTO's ability to incorporate development into its 
main goals. They have criticized everything from the enforcement of intellectual 
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property rights to liberal customs policy reforms as by their view they pose an 
eminent threat to the least developed and less secured countries’ development. 
The problem of high implementation costs is coupled with the belief that the WTO has 
failed to deliver promised gains to the poor countries in such important areas as textiles and 
agriculture, where tariff reductions have been slower than in industrial sectors. As a result, the 
developing states believe that the pattern of protectionism is in favor of the rich and is biased against 
the poor since the trade barriers for and on the goods produced by those poor are among the highest. 
They also argue that topped with the “participation constraint”, such as insufficient negotiating 
experience, small and inexperienced Geneva Permanent Mission delegations, inability to fully 
participate in many important WTO meetings, and poor domestic inter-agency work organization, 
does not allow the poorer states to fully enjoy or exercise WTO benefits.  
Many low-income countries are fearful of the possible implications of trade liberalization 
for them. The main reason to such fear is the lack of understanding and assistance on behalf of the 
developed nations to make sure that all of the WTO rules, regulations and obligations that come 
with them, make clear sense and are understood by the developing countries. 
Nonetheless, since it is in the developing countries own interest to have strong and effective 
WTO multilateral trading system, it should also be in their interest not to simply be a part to new 
multilateral trade talks and give their comments on suggested proposals by the developed members, 
but to take an initiative that would allow them to create such policies that are receptive of their 
interests and goals. 
Kazakhstan as one of the developing countries and prospect WTO member should thereby, 
be more careful by not overreacting to the claims of the trade liberalization opponents. It is totally, 
understandable that in any other country or community, there are always supporters and opponents 
of the issue, and Kazakhstan is not and cannot be an exception to such situation. Yet, it should not 
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follow the populist ideas, as it is always easier to be protectionist rather than liberal, and continue its 
path towards greater liberalization and integration into the global multilateralism.  
Despite some free trade opponents’ argument that the WTO had failed to achieve its main 
goal, it is clear that the most important goal of this organization has been and is continued to being 
achieved. The reciprocal removal of barriers to trade in goods and services has been taking place 
since the formation of the GATT and has intensified with the creation of the WTO. Therefore, it is 
not a question of joining or not joining the WTO, but rather a question of assessing costs and 
benefits and trying to choose a less burdensome pace for each individual country and case.  
Indeed, because the benefits of globalization and the gains of increased global integration 
are unevenly distributed across and within nations, the reforms required for wider benefit enjoyment 
will become even greater as the current and future rounds of WTO multilateral trade negotiations 
continue. 
Therefore, it is essentially important for Kazakhstan to be in tact with the global 
developments; otherwise, it may be stuck in the early capitalism forever. Further protection of the 
market from competition will eventually lead to hopeless, lagging domestic industry, and mere raw 
material imports will not be able to substitute for underdeveloped manufacturing and processing 
sectors. 
In general, Kazakhstan has achieved a sizeable success in restructuring its economy, 
implementing liberal policies, creating legal framework based on the international standards, and 
enforcing their provisions. 
Therefore, in the intellectual property right protection and enforcement Kazakhstan, which 
started from the scratch, as the Soviet system did not foresee any legal or regulatory framework for 
the protection of the intellectual property rights, is among the most advanced countries of the CIS. 
Annual volumes of licensed Microsoft and other IT companies’ product sales are the best prove of 
Kazakhstan’s success. Yet, in order for Kazakhstan to become WTO member and to more 
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importantly be able to fulfill its ambitious goals in innovative-industrial development the country 
still has a long way to go. It is necessary for the intellectual property rights protection system-
building nation to ensure that their new domestic legal texts fully correspond to the provisions of the 
relevant international conventions as well as the TRIPs Agreement. Effective enforcement, which is 
central to the TRIPs Agreement, depends on effective institution building in the legal system as a 
whole, which, in turn, is part and parcel of the difficult process of systemic transformation. Thereby, 
it is important that Kazakhstan continues its work in the enforcement of the intellectual property 
rights protection.  
Despite considerable changes and restructurings undertaken by the Kazakhstani government 
in the country’s electricity sector, there are still numerous unresolved and unaddressed issues which 
handicap further development and restructuring of the electricity sector, and the economy in general. 
It is clear that further liberalization and more competition, which will push companies in the 
electricity sector to replace obsolete equipment, upgrade their facilities, and increase efficiency in 
order to be compatible, need to be introduced. Taking into account poor technical conditions of the 
electricity sector it becomes obvious that large investments are necessary. To attract such invest, 
Kazakhstan has insure its commitment for fear competition and liberal reforms.  
Pursuit of reform in services is no easy task, and the Government of the country should be 
ready to face domestic resistance and pressure for continuing protectionism. It should also make all 
the possible efforts so its national schedule submitted to the WTO, reflects the reality of its situation. 
Reforming the regulatory systems in services, and thoughtfully opening up the market to wider 
domestic and international competition is thus very much in Kazakhstan’s domestic economic 
interest. These reforms cannot be accomplished overnight, since both the government and the 
industry need time to assess the situation and necessary knowledge and skills. Moreover, since 
economic dislocations and consequences accompany all reforms, they need to be implemented at a 
socially acceptable pace of adjustment.   
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Despite the seeming success of the telecoms industry in Kazakhstan, the fact that such 
success was largely possible due to the closeness and protection of Kazakhstan’s 
telecommunications market. Opening up the telecommunications sector, however, will result not 
only in lower tariffs and better quality service as a result of competition, but will also hurt current 
market leaders such as Kazakhstan’s national operator – Kazakhtelecom. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that in the globalization era it is totally unacceptable and 
economically unsustainable, especially for the small economies like Kazakhstan, to remain closed 
and exercise protectionist attitudes. Thereby, Kazakhstan’s WTO accession negotiations should 
serve as a stimulus for liberalization and global integration process, by insuring provisions of non-
discriminatory treatment, market accessibility and open competition. In addition, Kazakhstan may 
and should use its regional integration experience with the CIS, the Customs Union, and the EEC, in 
more difficult, complicated, but at the same time more important negations of its WTO accession.   
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